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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Recent high-profile events from the Columbia space shuttle disas-
ter and Catholic Church sex scandal to the debacles at major U.S. 
corporations and financial institutions have caused a renewed inter-
est in the subject of organizational misconduct.1 Yet we still know 
                                                                                                                    
          *  Visiting Professor, University of Virginia School of Law; Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of North Carolina. Krawiec@email.unc.edu. I thank workshop participants at Harvard 
Business School, Boston University Law School, and Roger Williams University Law 
School, and fellow panelists and audience members at the American Constitution Society’s 
Annual Convention and at a symposium on The Behavioral Analysis of Legal Institutions 
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 1. John Schwartz & Matthew L. Wald, Report on Loss of Shuttle Focuses on NASA 
Blunders and Issues Somber Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at A1 (quoting a report 
of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board that blames NASA’s “broken safety culture” 
for the Columbia disaster); DAVID FRANCE, OUR FATHERS: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AN AGE OF SCANDAL (2004) (discussing the role of the Catholic 
Church hierarchy in sustaining and covering up the sexual misconduct of numerous 
priests). Organizational misconduct—conduct undertaken at least in part to benefit the or-
ganization—should be distinguished from occupational misconduct—conduct undertaken 
solely to benefit the perpetrator and in which the organization may actually be the victim. 
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relatively little about this extremely important subject. For example, 
what induces large and important segments of an organization to en-
gage in or ignore deviant behavior? What does and should our legal 
system do to deter such behavior? Are we currently doing enough?  
 This Article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) in 1991, the U.S. legal 
regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liabil-
ity toward a system of duty-based organizational liability.2 Under 
this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is depend-
ent on whether the organization has exercised due care to avoid the 
harm in question, rather than on traditional agency principles of re-
spondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of 
care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organi-
zation had in place “internal compliance structures” ostensibly de-
signed to detect and discourage such conduct.3 
 I argue, however, that any duty-based liability system that condi-
tions the organization’s duty on the presence of internal compliance 
structures is likely to fail because courts lack sufficient information 
about the effectiveness of such structures. As a result, an internal 
compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of 
largely cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal li-
ability without reducing the incidence of organizational misconduct. 
This leads to two potential problems: first, an underdeterrence of or-
ganizational misconduct and, second, a proliferation of costly but in-
effective internal compliance structures.  
 I then explore two possible explanations for the U.S. legal sys-
tem’s move toward a compliance-based liability regime: (1) an overre-
liance on agency cost explanations for organizational misconduct and 
(2) public choice explanations. I argue that an overreliance on agency 
cost explanations for organizational misconduct and rent-seeking by 
                                                                                                                    
See MARSHALL B. CLINARD ET AL., CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY 173 (3d ed., 
Anderson Publ’g Co. 1994) (1967) (dividing white collar crime into two types: corporate 
crime and occupational crime); John Braithwaite, White Collar Crime, 11 ANN. REV. SOC. 
1, 19 (1985) (same). Common examples of occupational misconduct include embezzlement 
and the acceptance of kickbacks. In addition, the term “organizational misconduct” encom-
passes actions by all organizations, including corporations, nonprofits, and government en-
tities, and includes not only crimes but torts and violations of the organization’s ethics or 
conduct codes, even when such violations are not illegal. See, e.g., Laura Shill Schrager & 
James F. Short, Jr., Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime, 25 SOC. PROBS. 407 
(1978) (defining “organizational crime”). 
 2. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) (stating that the existing legal regime closely approxi-
mates a rule of “pure strict vicarious liability”). 
 3. See infra Part III.A for a definition of the term “internal compliance structures.” 
This move toward “compliance-oriented” regulation is part of a global trend. Christine 
Parker, Reinventing Regulation Within the Corporation: Compliance-Oriented Regulatory 
Innovation, 32 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 529, 529-30 (2000). 
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powerful interest groups both contribute to the growth of internal 
compliance-based liability regimes. As a result, the U.S. legal regime 
is likely to continue its march toward duty-based liability regimes 
that rely on internal compliance structures in assessing liability or 
sanctions, because deep-rooted theoretical and political forces con-
spire to promote such a regime. 
 Part II of this Article discusses the three primary methods for as-
signing firm-level liability for agent misconduct: strict vicarious li-
ability, negligence, and a composite liability regime that combines 
elements of both negligence and strict liability.4 Both negligence and 
composite liability regimes require a court or agency determination 
regarding whether the organization has met its duty of care, typi-
cally determined by reference to the organization’s internal compli-
ance structures. However, because courts and agencies lack reliable 
information regarding the effectiveness of such structures, internal 
compliance-based liability systems are likely to fail. As elaborated in 
Part II, this does not mean that strict vicarious liability systems are 
perfect or costless. However, many of these costs can be minimized 
through evidentiary privilege rules, mitigation rules that reward re-
porting and cooperation after the discovery of organizational miscon-
duct, and various other relatively mild changes to the legal regime. 
 Part III argues that, although the OSG is typically held out as an 
ideal model of duty-based organizational liability, large and impor-
tant areas of U.S. law are actually duty-based organizational liability 
regimes. Indeed, in many areas of law—including environmental, 
tort, employment discrimination, corporate, securities, and health 
care—organizational liability for agent misconduct is determined 
through either a composite regime that assigns blame based on a 
strict liability standard and determines sanctions based on a negli-
gence standard or a negligence-based regime that bases organiza-
tional liability on a finding that the organization failed to satisfy the 
standard of due care. In both cases, the organization’s negligence is 
determined by reference to a standard of due care that rewards or-
ganizations for (and, correspondingly, punishes organizations for the 
lack of) internal compliance structures.  
 Part IV argues, however, that the presumed effectiveness of duty-
based liability regimes that premise organizational culpability on the 
presence of internal compliance structures is backed by little, if any, 
empirical support. Although there has been relatively little compre-
hensive study of the impact of internal compliance structures on the 
incidence of organizational misconduct, the available empirical evi-
                                                                                                                    
 4. Hereafter, negligence-based vicarious liability and composite liability regimes are 
collectively referred to as “duty-based liability regimes,” except where the context requires 
a distinction between the two. 
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dence does not support the contention that the internal compliance 
structures typically examined by courts and regulators in assessing 
organizational due care reduce organizational misconduct. Indeed, 
several large-scale empirical studies document a positive correlation 
between organizational misconduct and the types of internal compli-
ance structures most frequently relied on by courts and regulators in 
assessing liability and sanctions, suggesting that some organizations 
may employ internal compliance structures primarily as a window-
dressing mechanism that provides both market legitimacy and re-
duced organizational liability for agent misconduct. 
 Part V explains that, rather than adopting an effective system for 
deterring organizational misconduct, the U.S. legal regime may have 
adopted a costly “safe harbor” that allows organizations to evade li-
ability for organizational misconduct, so long as they have adopted 
internal compliance structures.5 I then explore some possible reasons 
for the legal regime’s extreme reliance on internal compliance struc-
tures in assessing organizational culpability, despite their poor em-
pirical showing as a means of reducing organizational misconduct. 
Although it is of course possible that the legal regime’s enthusiastic 
embrace of internal compliance-based organizational liability is at-
tributable to a simple misplaced faith in the effectiveness of internal 
compliance structures in deterring organizational misconduct, this 
Article suggests that the answer is likely far more complicated and 
may be due to two factors.  
 First, it is possible that the legal regime’s embrace of internal 
compliance structures is partly attributable to an overreliance on 
agency cost explanations for organizational misconduct. In other 
words, if the legal regime presumes that organizational misconduct 
is simply a principal-agent problem, legal incentives that induce 
principals to more carefully police their agents may be a rational re-
sponse to that perceived problem.  
 Second, public choice theory may explain some aspects of the legal 
regime’s dependence on internal compliance structures as an organ-
izational liability determinant. As discussed in this Article, although 
the implementation of comprehensive internal compliance structures 
is costly to organizations, it is far less costly than actually altering 
current business practices. Consequently, once public outcry makes 
regulation inevitable, organizations may settle, or even push, for a 
legal regime that incorporates internal compliance structures into 
organizational liability determinations. In addition, other powerful 
interest groups have a stake in and benefit from internal compliance-
                                                                                                                    
 5. Cf. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy 
Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95 (2004) (querying why corporate interests have not lobbied 
for such a safe harbor from criminal liability). 
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based liability regimes, particularly legal compliance professionals 
such as lawyers, compliance and ethics consultants, in-house compli-
ance and human resources personnel, and diversity trainers. 
 Part VI briefly addresses the possibility of holding board members 
and senior management vicariously liable for the misdeeds of lower-
level agents and warns that such liability is unlikely to effectively 
substitute for organizational liability. Part VII concludes. 
II.   THE CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY REGIME 
 This Part outlines the three basic organizational liability stan-
dards for agent misconduct—strict vicarious liability, negligence, and 
composite liability—and the benefits and drawbacks of each.6 I dem-
onstrate that duty-based liability regimes that look to the presence of 
internal compliance structures to determine whether the organiza-
tion has met its duty of care are likely to fail, because courts lack re-
liable information regarding the effectiveness of such structures. As 
a result, strict vicarious liability with some modifications to encour-
age reporting and cooperation with government investigations is su-
perior to both negligence-based and composite liability systems for 
deterring organizational misconduct and inducing the appropriate 
level and type of internal enforcement measures. 
A.   Strict Vicarious Liability 
 Under a strict vicarious liability standard, organizational liability 
is imposed whenever an organizational actor causes some punishable 
harm, regardless of any attempts by the organization to avoid the 
harm.7 The premise behind strict vicarious liability is that by forcing 
                                                                                                                    
 6. It is generally recognized that some type of firm-level liability is necessary in or-
der to effectively deter organizational misconduct for a variety of reasons, including the 
limited assets of organizational agents, the superior ability of firm-level liability to force 
the internalization of the costs of harmful activity, and the potential savings in enforce-
ment costs. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Miscon-
duct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 692 (1997) (argu-
ing that firm-level liability addresses problems of judgment-proof agents and costly gov-
ernment sanctioning); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 319, 322 (1996) (arguing that firm-level liability saves on enforcement costs because, 
“[r]ather than having to invest resources to penetrate the corporate hierarchy and decision-
making structure to determine the culpability of particular individuals, the state can sim-
ply penalize the firm”). However, many scholars debate whether this liability should ever 
take the form of criminal, as opposed to civil or administrative, sanctions. See Fischel & 
Sykes, supra, at 322. In addition, cogent arguments can be made that vicarious liability of 
senior officers and directors for organizational misconduct is, under some circumstances, a 
useful complement to or substitute for organizational liability in deterring organizational 
misconduct. See infra Part VI for a discussion of this argument. 
 7. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the organization may be held liable for 
the acts of its agents undertaken with an intent to benefit the organization that are within 
the ordinary scope of the agent’s employment. I refer to such agents as “organizational ac-
tors” in this Article. 
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organizations to internalize all of the costs associated with their ac-
tivities, the organization’s products are appropriately priced and the 
socially optimal amount of the good or service is produced.8 
 In addition, strict vicarious liability systems may force the adoption 
of the socially optimal level of internal organizational enforcement and 
deterrence mechanisms (internal compliance structures). This is be-
cause when an organization bears all of the costs of any harm it 
causes, it has an incentive to reduce the incidence of such harm up to 
the point where the costs of such reduction equal the benefits.9 
 Despite these advantages, strict vicarious liability systems have 
been criticized on a number of fronts for creating incentives at odds 
with the goal of deterring organizational misconduct. For example, 
some internal compliance structures, known as “policing measures,” 
may increase the probability of detection, either because information 
regarding the occurrence of misconduct may be reported to govern-
ment authorities by the organization or a whistleblower or because the 
government may subpoena any information regarding organizational 
misconduct that has been internally generated. Accordingly, it has 
been argued that under a strict vicarious liability system, organiza-
tions have an incentive to avoid implementing internal compliance 
structures that might reduce the incidence of organizational wrongdo-
ing.10 This results in increased levels of organizational misconduct and 
more expensive and less effective government policing of such behav-
ior. 
 In addition, some commentators argue that attempts to induce in-
ternal organizational policing under strict vicarious liability regimes 
suffer from credibility problems. In other words, firms’ internal polic-
ing efforts will deter employee misconduct only if employees believe 
that firms will actually employ those efforts to detect, report, and pun-
ish such misconduct. Under a strict vicarious liability system, it is ar-
gued, these threats are not credible because the firm itself will suffer 
increased liability from such efforts.11 
                                                                                                                    
 8. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 321-22; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the 
Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1223-24 (2003). 
 9. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 703; Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 324 
(arguing that monitoring is desirable up to the point where the marginal cost would exceed 
the marginal social gain in the form of reduced harmful activity). 
 10. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 2, at 840; Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 708. 
Arlen and Kraakman distinguish “policing” measures that deter misconduct by increasing 
the probability of detection from “preventive” measures that deter misconduct by altering 
the costs or benefits of misconduct but do not impact the probability of detection. Id. at 
701-02. Examples of preventive measures include the firm’s compensation and promotion 
policies, strict controls over cash disbursements, and strict accounting for chemical waste. 
Id. According to Arlen and Kraakman, strict vicarious liability causes perverse incentive 
problems with respect to policing measures but not preventive measures. Id. at 707. 
 11. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 712-14. 
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 These problems, however, are even more severe under duty-based 
organizational liability systems than under strict vicarious liability 
systems. As discussed in Parts II.B and C of this Article, due to the 
informational disadvantages of courts and regulators regarding the 
effectiveness of internal policing measures, any duty-based organiza-
tional liability system produces perverse incentives of its own. Spe-
cifically, organizations have an incentive to invest in low-cost, poten-
tially ineffective internal policing measures that fail to reduce organ-
izational misconduct, yet nonetheless reduce organizational liability. 
More disturbing, the analysis of the empirical evidence in Part IV of 
this Article suggests that many firms have adopted exactly this cos-
metic approach to organizational compliance. Furthermore, employ-
ees are keenly aware of the extent to which such policing measures 
are cosmetic; this can lead to potentially severe credibility problems 
in any duty-based liability regime that relies on internal compliance 
structures in assessing guilt or sanctions.12   
 In addition, to the extent that policing and credibility concerns are 
potential drawbacks of a strict vicarious liability system, these draw-
backs are surmountable and need not prevent the implementation of 
successful strict (or modified strict) liability systems. Firms can still 
be encouraged to engage in internal policing and cooperation with 
government authorities through some combination of evidentiary 
privilege rules and reduced sanctions for cooperation with govern-
ment investigations. In other words, firms can be rewarded not for 
the mere existence of internal compliance structures, but for ex post 
demonstrations that such structures revealed useful information that 
was then used to penalize those responsible for misconduct, thus pre-
sumably deterring future misconduct.  
 First, fears that subsequent government or third-party access to 
information produced by internal compliance structures will deter 
the implementation of such structures can be addressed through 
                                                                                                                    
 12. See, e.g., MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF 
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 132-36 (1983) (concluding from interviews with sixty-four retired 
managers of Fortune 500 corporations that the behavior and philosophy of top manage-
ment was most commonly asserted as the primary reason for illegal employee behavior); 
ETHICS OFFICER ASS’N, THE 2000 MEMBER SURVEY REPORT 30 (2001) (listing short-term fi-
nancial pressures, lack of financial or staff support, and compensation system inconsistent 
with corporate values as three of the top four principal obstacles to the work of ethics offi-
cers); ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2003: HOW EMPLOYEES VIEW 
ETHICS IN THEIR ORGANIZATIONS 31 (2003) (“Employees who perceive that their supervi-
sors do more than ‘talk about the importance of ethics’ observe less misconduct in their or-
ganizations.”); Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Perform-
ance: Management Commitments, External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Practices, 42 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 539, 547-48 (1999) (finding that top management commitment to ethical 
behavior is more important in deterring misconduct than are external forces, such as the 
OSG, which tend to promote only formal changes, such as the adoption of ethics codes, and 
are not fully integrated into organizational activities). 
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privilege rules, such as those employed by many states in connection 
with internal environmental and other audits.13 Similarly, the attor-
ney-client privilege has been successfully invoked in some cases to 
shield corporate audits from discovery and disclosure.14 In other 
words, rules mandating that any information produced through in-
ternal policing measures will not be used against the organization, 
provided that the organization cooperates with any government in-
vestigation, could alleviate this concern and improve the deterrence 
function of strict liability.15 
 The proper role of privilege in organizational policing and en-
forcement is subject to much debate. The use of such privileges 
doubtless raises concerns of its own and may be more appropriate or 
practical in connection with some types of violations than others.16 
The point here, however, is that the most commonly advocated sub-
stitute for audit privileges—duty-based organizational liability—
presents even greater problems.17 
 Fears that firms will fail to implement internal policing measures 
under a strict vicarious liability system can be further alleviated 
through rules that reward organizations for post-offense reporting 
and cooperation. For example, if organizations are offered reduced 
penalties in exchange for self-detection and reporting, the incentive 
to implement policing measures under a strict liability regime may 
                                                                                                                    
 13. See, e.g., David Markert et al., Environmental Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 443, 
460-62 (2004) (discussing statutory, attorney-client, and other privileges designed to pro-
tect internal corporate audits). 
 14. Id. at 462 n.98. 
 15. Professors Arlen and Kraakman refer to this version of modified strict liability as 
“probability-fixed strict liability,” and they argue that it is unworkable in both practice and 
theory. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 719-21. As a practical matter, they argue that 
modified strict liability is unworkable because it is not “truly possible to insulate a firm 
from the liability effects of its own policing efforts.” Id. at 720. However, evidentiary privi-
leges such as these are successfully used throughout criminal law to prevent government 
authorities from accessing certain information. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 9.3-.6 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the fruit of the poisonous tree 
and other exclusionary rules of criminal procedure). As a theoretical matter, Arlen and 
Kraakman argue that it would require prohibitively large sanctions in order to induce 
firms to police against low-visibility misconduct. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 720.  
However, this is true as a practical matter with respect to duty-based organizational liabil-
ity regimes as well. 
 16. See, e.g., David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immu-
nity, 81 IOWA L. REV. 969 (1996) (discussing the debate over these privileges); Steven A. 
Herman, NCSL Study Finds that State Environmental Audit Laws Have No Impact on 
Company Self Auditing and Disclosure of Violations, NAT’L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Dec. 
1998/Jan. 1999, at 18, 19 (finding that more than three-fourths of companies surveyed re-
port performing audits without regard to the existence of audit laws, but that most also fail 
to report violations, even when the state provides an audit privilege). 
 17. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, When Companies Come Clean: 
Mitigation Is Better than Environmental Audit Privileges, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2000, 
at 46 (arguing that a compliance-based organizational liability regime is preferable to the 
use of internal audit privileges). 
2005]                BEYOND THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 579 
 
be substantially increased. In fact, such reduced penalties in ex-
change for self-reporting and cooperation already exist under the 
OSG and also are employed informally in connection with many in-
vestigations and prosecutions of organizational misconduct.18  
 In short, the problems identified by commentators in connection 
with a strict vicarious liability regime are real, but they are not in-
surmountable obstacles to an effective strict vicarious liability re-
gime. Several relatively minor changes to the current legal regime 
(some of which have already been implemented with apparent suc-
cess in certain regulatory settings) may alleviate many of the con-
cerns expressed by critics of strict vicarious liability regimes. Finally, 
as detailed in Part II.C below, internal compliance-based organiza-
tional liability regimes pose similar, and arguably more severe, prob-
lems.  
B.   Negligence 
 Under a negligence-based organizational liability regime, firm-
level liability is imposed whenever an organizational actor causes 
some punishable harm and the standard of due care is not met. Typi-
cally, this means that the organization has failed to take sufficient 
measures to avoid the harm; for example, it has failed to implement 
training programs or other internal compliance structures or to ob-
serve industry standards regarding operating methods. 
 Negligence-based organizational liability regimes are considered 
inferior to strict liability regimes in terms of encouraging the socially 
optimal level of production, because negligence-based organizational 
liability regimes do not force organizations to bear the entire cost of 
their harmful conduct.19 Accordingly, goods and services produced by 
                                                                                                                    
 18. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(g) (2004) [hereinafter 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (listing organizational cooperation in the investigation and vol-
untary self-reporting of the offense among several culpability factors); Shirah Neiman, 
Corporate Fraud Issues II: Interview with United States Attorney James B. Comey Regard-
ing the Department of Justice’s Policy on Requesting Corporations Under Criminal Investi-
gation to Waive the Attorney Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, November 2003, 
United States Attorney’s Bulletin, in 2 36TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1089 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1456, 
2004) (discussing the role of corporate cooperation with prosecutors in inducing leniency); 
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys, U.S. Department of 
Justice 6 (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf (last 
updated Nov. 15, 2004) (“In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corpora-
tion’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with 
the government’s investigation may be relevant factors.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 705; Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, 
at 328; Khanna, supra note 8, at 1226 (stating that “negligence standards tend to fail on 
the activity level front because they do not force the firm to bear the full social costs of its 
products”); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1980). 
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organizations in such a regime will be underpriced, and too much 
will be produced.20 
 Furthermore, strict vicarious liability standards are considered 
superior to negligence-based organizational liability standards in 
terms of inducing the optimal level of internal compliance structures. 
Although negligence-based liability could in theory induce the opti-
mal level of internal deterrence measures, it is unlikely to achieve 
this goal in practice due to the difficulty of accurately determining 
whether the standard of care has been met.  
 Judicial and agency determinations regarding whether a particu-
lar organization’s internal compliance structures meet the required 
standard of due care may be faulty for a variety of reasons. First, 
courts and agencies may require either too many or too few struc-
tures in setting the standard because they lack sufficient information 
to make such decisions accurately.21 As a result, they may demand 
internal compliance structures whose costs exceed their deterrence 
benefits, which would result in social waste. Alternatively, they may 
demand too few internal compliance structures, or internal compli-
ance structures that are ineffective in deterring misconduct, result-
ing in underdeterrence. Second, even assuming that courts and agen-
cies are able to accurately set the standard of care, they are likely to 
misjudge whether the organization has met that standard (in other 
words, whether it has adopted the appropriate number and type of 
structures) in the particular case at hand.22  
 Finally, courts and agencies are unlikely to possess the ability to 
differentiate effective internal compliance structures from cosmetic 
ones—that is, those structures designed to create the illusion of com-
pliance for purposes of avoiding legal liability, rather than for the 
purpose of deterring misconduct.23 This is because differentiating 
real internal compliance structures from purely symbolic ones is a 
difficult task for legal decisionmakers, particularly ex post when, by 
definition, the structures in question have failed to deter misconduct. 
Additionally, the indicators of an effective internal compliance struc-
ture are easily mimicked, and the true level of effectiveness is diffi-
cult for any decisionmaker lacking perfect information to deter-
mine.24 
                                                                                                                    
 20. Shavell, supra note 19, at 4. 
 21. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 329; Khanna, supra note 8, at 1227-28; Kimberly 
D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 487 (2003) (arguing that because legal decisionmakers are unable to determine this 
with any accuracy, internal compliance-based liability regimes tend to both underdeter 
misconduct and impose socially wasteful costs on organizations). 
 22. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1228. 
 23. See Krawiec, supra note 21, at 536-37. 
 24. Id. at 491-92. 
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 This is not to imply that accurate determinations by courts and 
agencies regarding whether internal compliance structures are cos-
metic or real are impossible. Presumably, given sufficient amounts of 
time and money, reliable determinations as to the quality of internal 
compliance could be made. However, as a society, we have shown no 
willingness to dedicate the extraordinary resources to courts, prose-
cutors, and agencies that would be necessary to perform this func-
tion. Moreover, given the lower costs and greater effectiveness of an 
appropriately designed strict vicarious liability regime, this refusal is 
probably wise. 
C.   Composite Regimes 
 Composite regimes are organizational liability regimes that com-
bine elements of both strict vicarious liability and negligence. In 
their most common form, composite liability regimes assign liability 
based on a strict liability standard but apportion sanctions based on 
a negligence standard.25 Although the OSG is typically offered as an 
example of such a regime, as discussed in Part III of this Article, 
large segments of the U.S. legal regime relating to organizational li-
ability for agent misconduct are best characterized as composite re-
gimes. Others, despite their theoretical similarity to strict vicarious 
liability regimes, are actually negligence regimes, due to prosecuto-
rial and agency discretion and judicially crafted exceptions to the 
strict vicarious liability rule.  
 Despite the popularity of composite regimes among legal scholars 
and government actors, as discussed in Part IV of this Article, little 
evidence exists to support the theory that composite liability regimes 
that incorporate organizational internal compliance structures into 
the sanction calculation deter organizational misconduct. In fact, a 
growing body of empirical evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of 
such regimes. 
 These results should not be entirely surprising. Composite re-
gimes, at least in practice, present all of the same incentive problems 
discussed in connection with negligence regimes. In other words, neg-
ligence-based organizational liability regimes are criticized for a fail-
ure to force organizations to fully internalize the costs of their harm-
ful activities. This same criticism, however, can be leveled at compos-
ite regimes. Strict liability regimes, after all, only force the internali-
zation of costs if the appropriate sanction is applied.26 By reducing 
                                                                                                                    
 25. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 717 (referring to such regimes as “mixed li-
ability regimes”). 
 26. This optimal sanction is equal to the harm caused divided by the probability of de-
tection. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines 
and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
239 (1993). 
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the applicable sanctions based on a factor—the presence of internal 
compliance structures—unrelated to either the amount of harm or 
the probability of detection, the composite regime moves away from 
the optimal sanction, reducing the extent to which the sanctioned or-
ganization is forced to internalize the costs of its harmful conduct.27 
 In addition, negligence-based organizational liability regimes are 
criticized for, at least in practice, failing to provide incentives for the 
adoption of the optimal level and type of internal compliance struc-
tures. This same criticism, however, can and should be leveled at 
composite regimes. As under the negligence-based regime, courts and 
agencies may err in setting the standard by including too few, too 
many, or an inappropriate type of internal compliance structures in 
the due care standard. Furthermore, because courts and agencies 
lack sufficient information regarding the effectiveness of internal 
compliance structures, they are likely to err in determining whether 
a particular organization has met the standard in any given case 
and, in any event, are unlikely to possess the ability to differentiate 
symbolic or cosmetic compliance structures, designed primarily to 
avoid liability rather than to deter misconduct, from genuine ones.28 
III.   UNITED STATES LAW AS A COMPOSITE LIABILITY REGIME 
 This Part demonstrates that, although the OSG is correctly held 
out as the paradigm of a composite liability regime, large and impor-
tant segments of U.S. law are best characterized as composite re-
gimes.29 Others, despite their theoretical similarity to strict vicarious 
liability regimes, are actually negligence regimes due to prosecutorial 
and agency enforcement discretion and judicially crafted exceptions 
from the strict vicarious liability standard. In both cases, the deter-
mination of whether the organization has met the standard of due 
                                                                                                                    
 27. Presumably, composite regimes that reward organizations for the presence of in-
ternal compliance structures do so on the assumption that such structures increase the 
probability of detection, and legal scholars defend composite regimes on exactly this basis. 
Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 733. As discussed in Part IV of this Article, however, 
when internal compliance structures are cosmetic, rather than real, and legal decision-
makers are unable to tell the difference, internal compliance structures cannot be expected 
to reduce misconduct or increase the probability of detection. 
 28. Krawiec, supra note 21, at 541 (arguing that not only are courts unable to make 
this distinction but that a review of the caselaw demonstrates that, in many cases, they do 
not even try). 
 29. On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines should be interpreted by judges as merely advisory, rather than mandatory, to 
avoid violating criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. United States v. Booker, 125 
S. Ct. 738 (2005). Although it is unclear how this ruling will impact organizational sentenc-
ing, many corporate lawyers are advising clients to continue treating the OSG as if it were 
mandatory. Gary Fields, Ruling on Sentencing Guidelines May Also Affect Corporate 
Crime, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2005, at A4 (quoting one corporate counsel as stating that, 
“[a]s far as corporations are concerned, the compliance guidelines are not advisory, they 
are still mandatory” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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care is determined by reference to the presence of internal compli-
ance structures. Part III.A of this Article defines the term “internal 
compliance structures” and illustrates the type of internal compli-
ance structures that are most prevalent in U.S. organizations. Part 
III.B describes the role of these internal compliance structures in the 
U.S. legal regime by characterizing a broad array of laws as either 
composite or negligence-based liability regimes that incorporate in-
ternal compliance structures into the organizational due care as-
sessment. 
A.   Internal Compliance Structures Defined 
 The internal compliance structures adopted by most organizations 
are quite similar and are based primarily on two legal sources: the 
minimum steps for an effective internal compliance system set out in 
the OSG30 and equal employment opportunity (EEO) law.31 For ex-
ample, the centerpiece of any internal compliance program is a writ-
ten ethics or conduct code that sets forth the ostensible limits of ac-
ceptable agent conduct.32 Most large organizations also have written 
EEO policies that confirm the organization’s commitment to nondis-
criminatory hiring, firing, and promotion policies. Many conduct and 
EEO codes also detail mechanisms of code enforcement, such as in-
ternal reporting and information-gathering procedures, policies re-
garding the investigation of reported violations, whistleblowing pro-
cedures and policies regarding the protection of whistleblowers from 
retaliation, and internal procedures and sanctions for conduct code 
violations.33 
                                                                                                                    
 30. Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: 
Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 367, 
370 (2002). 
 31. EEO law includes a variety of statutes, rules, and regulations addressing work-
place discrimination. The most important of these are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-
12,213 (2000), the rules, regulations and interpretations of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, and a variety of state statutes. See Elizabeth Chambliss & Lauren B. 
Edelman, Sociological Perspectives on Equal Employment Law (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author). 
 32. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 8B2.1. Over ninety percent of For-
tune 500 corporations and over seventy-five percent of other large corporations report hav-
ing an ethics or conduct code. Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering 
and Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes, 15 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 21, 21 (1996); Gary R. 
Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid-1990’s: An Empirical Study of the For-
tune 1000, 18 J. BUS. ETHICS 283 (1999). 
 33. Brien, supra note 32, at 21; Richard S. Gruner, Developing Judicial Standards for 
Evaluating Compliance Programs: Insights from EEO Litigation, in 1 CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE 2002, at 159, 169 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series 
No. B-1317, 2002). 
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 Second, effective internal compliance requires that conduct and 
EEO codes be communicated to the organization’s employees and 
other agents. Common mechanisms for such dissemination include 
training programs, organization newsletters, employee manuals, and 
organizational websites.34 In the EEO context, this communication 
often takes the form of “diversity” or harassment training. 
 Third, organizations must have monitoring and auditing systems 
reasonably designed to detect prohibited conduct by organizational 
agents.35 Fourth, most organizational compliance programs contain a 
reporting mechanism that allows employees to report violations of 
the organization’s conduct code or of laws and regulations without 
fear of retaliation by others within the organization.36 This includes 
internal grievance procedures designed to allow employees to express 
concerns regarding discriminatory conduct. Finally, specific, high-
level personnel within the organization must be assigned responsibil-
ity for oversight of compliance with the organization’s conduct or eth-
ics code.37 
B.   Internal Compliance Structures and Organizational Due Care 
 As widely noted, the OSG in many ways represents the prototypi-
cal composite liability regime. For all practical purposes, the OSG 
requires organizations to adopt internal compliance structures by re-
ducing to as little as one-twentieth or increasing by as much as four 
hundred percent the original base fine faced by organizations con-
victed of a federal crime based on a variety of mitigating or aggravat-
ing factors, including the presence of organizational internal compli-
ance structures.38 Assuming the absence of any aggravating factors, 
such as involvement in the violation by high-level personnel, the 
presence of “effective” internal compliance structures will result in a 
reduction of the organization’s fine by up to sixty percent.39 
                                                                                                                    
 34. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A). 
 35. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A). 
 36. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C). 
 37. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B). In addition, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual lists as 
minimum steps for an effective internal compliance system requirements that the organi-
zation use due care not to delegate authority to agents with a propensity for illegal con-
duct, that the organization take all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the viola-
tion and prevent future similar violations once the offense is discovered, and that the code 
of conduct be consistently enforced. Id. §§ 8B2.1(b)(3), (6), (7). 
 38. Other culpability factors include tolerance of or participation in the violations by 
high-level personnel, the organization’s prior history of similar misconduct, organizational 
cooperation in the investigation, voluntary self-reporting of the offense, and whether the 
organization accepted responsibility for the illegal conduct. Id. § 8C2.5. 
 39. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1). Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, effective inter-
nal compliance structures are those that are “reasonably designed, implemented, and en-
forced so that [they] generally [will be] effective in preventing and detecting criminal con-
duct. The failure to prevent or detect the instant offense does not necessarily mean that 
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 Because the OSG was one of the first major legal regimes to make 
the transition from strict vicarious liability to an internal compli-
ance-based standard, it is an extraordinarily important segment of 
the internal compliance-based legal regime. However, the OSG in-
ternal compliance-based approach to organizational misconduct was 
quickly emulated in other legal fields. As a result, today a wide vari-
ety of civil, criminal, and regulatory provisions encourage the adop-
tion of internal compliance structures through duty-based vicarious 
liability regimes. 
 For example, both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) incorpo-
rate the OSG composite liability concept by allowing reduced civil 
penalties and, in some cases, no criminal penalties for organizations 
with effective internal compliance structures.40 Furthermore, the 
HHS guidelines for determining the existence of an effective internal 
compliance program are fashioned directly after the OSG’s minimum 
steps for an effective compliance program.41 In addition, the Justice 
Department follows what amounts to a negligence-based organiza-
tional liability regime that considers organizations’ internal compli-
ance structures in deciding whether to criminally charge organiza-
tions for the acts of their employees and agents.42 Similarly, state at-
torneys general follow a negligence approach by considering organ-
izational internal compliance structures in making enforcement deci-
sions.43 
 The judiciary has also employed compliance-based liability stan-
dards in a variety of legal contexts that amount to the creation of a 
negligence-based organizational liability regime. For example, inter-
nal compliance structures may be relevant to a determination of 
                                                                                                                    
the program is not generally effective.” Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2). The manual goes on to list the 
minimum steps that the organization must have taken in order to qualify for a reduced 
sentence. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minimum 
steps. 
 40. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of 
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,625 (Apr. 11, 2000) (statement of policy); see also OFFICE 
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FRAUD PREVENTION AND 
DETECTION: COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE, at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.html 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter HHS GUIDELINES] (providing links to compliance pro-
gram guidance for, among others, pharmaceutical manufacturers, ambulance suppliers, 
nursing facilities, and hospitals). 
 41. See HHS GUIDELINES, supra note 40. The Office of the Inspector General of HHS 
has also required the adoption of internal compliance structures by organizations settling 
health care fraud charges. See Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave 
New World of Health Care Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51, 56 (1997). 
 42. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Deptartment of Justice, to 
All Component Heads and United States Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice (June 16, 
1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html (last updated Mar. 
9, 2000). 
 43. Junda Woo, Self-Policing Can Pay Off for Companies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1993, 
at B5. 
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whether an employee’s illegal or tortious conduct was undertaken 
with an intent to benefit the organization and thus determine organ-
izational civil punitive or criminal liability. Organizations may be 
able to demonstrate that an employee’s conduct was not undertaken 
with an intent to benefit the organization through evidence that the 
organizational defendant had in place ethics codes prohibiting the 
relevant conduct and compliance programs ostensibly designed to de-
tect violations.44  
 Corporate and securities law also contain elements of composite or 
negligence-based organizational liability regimes that provide an in-
centive for the adoption of internal compliance structures. Section 
15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act, for example, authorizes 
the SEC to suspend or revoke the registration of any broker/dealer 
that “has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing 
violations of the provisions of [the securities or commodities laws], 
another person who commits such a violation, if such other person is 
subject to his supervision.”45 This requirement is deemed met so long 
as procedures reasonably designed to detect and prevent violations 
have been implemented.46 
 The Delaware corporate law approach to claims that a board of di-
rectors has failed to adequately monitor the corporation’s employees 
and activities closely resembles an internal compliance-based ap-
proach to liability by holding directors liable for a breach of the duty 
of care when a failure to implement internal compliance structures 
results in organizational misconduct.47 Although this liability risk 
may be slight, it appears that corporate boards—at the urging of le-
                                                                                                                    
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) (suggesting 
that “a corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to express instruc-
tions and policies, but that the existence of such instructions and policies may be consid-
ered in determining whether the employee in fact acted to benefit the corporation”); In re 
the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 WL 527990, at *2 (D. Alaska Jan. 27, 1995) (up-
holding jury instructions that “you must consider whether the actions of employees were in 
violation of direct . . . policies of the defendant corporations”).  
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2000). 
 46. Id. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i). Similar provisions are contained in the Commodity Exchange 
Act and in the Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) rules. See, e.g., NASD Conduct Rule 
3010, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL (CCH) 4831 (2004) (requir-
ing NASD members to establish and maintain a system to supervise employees); NYSE 
RULE 342.21, 2 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE (CHH) ¶ 2342 (2004) (requiring that 
trades be subjected to review procedures); Chi. Bd. Options Exch. Rules 4.2, 9.8, CHICAGO 
BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE GUIDE (CCH) ¶¶ 2082, 2308 (2004); 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2000). 
See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to 
Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267 (2004) (discussing the diffusion of in-
ternal controls, particularly in the financial fraud area). 
 47. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(holding that in order to receive business judgment rule protection, directors must “exer-
cise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and reporting system is in 
concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will come to 
its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations”). 
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gal professionals—may have overestimated the risk of personal li-
ability.48   
 However, the legal arena that arguably has most ardently em-
braced the composite and negligence-based organizational liability 
approach and, consequently, has had the greatest impact on the 
adoption of internal compliance structures is EEO law, especially the 
law governing workplace harassment. EEO law incorporates stan-
dards of organizational due care into organizational liability deter-
minations in at least three ways.  
 First, internal compliance structures (especially EEO hiring, pro-
motion, and termination policies; grievance procedures; and diversity 
education programs) may operate as a defense against punitive dam-
ages in claims of intentional discrimination by allowing organiza-
tions to demonstrate good-faith efforts to comply with EEO law.49 Al-
though in many cases the defendant’s compliance structures have 
been found inadequate to insulate the employer from punitive dam-
ages, other defendants have managed to successfully invoke their in-
ternal compliance structures as a shield against punitive damages.50 
 Second, the employer’s EEO-related internal compliance struc-
tures may be examined—along with other circumstantial evidence—
to determine whether the employer harbored discriminatory intent.51 
In other words, because employers today rarely leave a “smoking 
gun” that plaintiffs can invoke to demonstrate overt animus, plain-
tiffs and defendants alike may rely on circumstantial evidence, in-
                                                                                                                    
 48. Because “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight” 
such as “an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting sys-
tem exists” leads to director liability, the risk of personal liability to directors is probably 
slight. Id. at 971. Corporate boards, however, seem to treat the risk as real. See Donald C. 
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 819-20 (2001) (arguing 
that boards of directors have overestimated the threat of personal liability under Care-
mark). 
 49. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (holding that employers who are 
able to demonstrate good-faith efforts to comply with EEO law may avoid punitive dam-
ages for the discriminatory acts of agents acting within the scope of their employment). 
 50. See, e.g., Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 548-49 (4th Cir. 
2003) (holding that a hospital could not be liable to African-American employees for puni-
tive damages because the hospital undertook widespread antidiscrimination efforts, in-
cluding its creation of a hospital-wide antidiscrimination policy and its implementation of 
a grievance policy and diversity training program; thus, it could not be vicariously liable 
for its managerial employees’ discriminatory decisions); Jaudon v. Elder Health, Inc., 125 
F. Supp. 2d 153, 172 (D. Md. 2000) (finding that the defendant employer had demonstrated 
a good-faith effort to comply with Title VII because it had “published, maintained, and dis-
tributed sexual harassment, open door, and equal opportunity policies”). 
 51. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of 
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1789-92 (1990) (discussing the use at trial of evidence of internal 
compliance structures, especially affirmative action policies, to establish the lack of inter-
est defense in sex discrimination cases). 
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cluding the presence or lack of EEO hiring, promotion, and termina-
tion policies, diversity training, and the like, in order to demonstrate 
or disprove intentional discrimination. 
 Finally, the employer’s internal compliance structures may be 
relevant to a determination of liability in any hostile environment 
harassment claim, especially supervisor hostile environment har-
assment of which the employer was unaware.52 Employers face liabil-
ity for hostile environment harassment under three different stan-
dards. First, for coworker hostile environment harassment, the em-
ployer is judged under a negligence standard and is liable for all har-
assment of which it knew or should have known and negligently 
failed to correct. Antiharassment policies, employee training de-
signed to prevent harassment, and formal harassment complaint 
procedures may all constitute evidence that the employer was not 
negligent in failing to discover the harassment.53 Similarly, these 
same EEO-compliance structures may be employed to demonstrate 
that, despite the plaintiff employee’s complaints of harassment, 
knowledge cannot be imputed to the employer.54 
 Second, with regard to supervisor hostile environment harass-
ment of which the employer was aware, the employer may be held li-
able for its own negligence in failing to properly respond to the har-
assment. The implementation of internal grievance procedures, anti-
                                                                                                                    
 52. Hostile environment harassment occurs when the employer’s behavior is so severe 
or pervasive that, although there is no tangible harm, such as job loss or decreased pay, 
the behavior nonetheless alters the terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title 
VII. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998). The Supreme Court has 
also recognized “tangible employment actions,” which involve “a significant change in em-
ployment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly 
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,” made on 
the basis of the employee’s membership in any Title VII protected class. Id. at 761. Be-
cause the employer faces strict liability for all tangible employment actions, id. at 762-63, 
however, the employer’s internal compliance structures should not be relevant to a finding 
of liability in tangible employment actions. 
 53. See, e.g., Newtown v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (D. Conn. 1999) (stat-
ing that an employer must provide an avenue for complaints in order to avoid liability for a 
negligent failure to know of existing harassment); Velez v. City of New Jersey, 817 A.2d 
409, 414 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding that “an employer may be held liable for 
sexual harassment under a theory of negligence based upon ‘its failure to have in place 
well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment policies, effective formal and informal com-
plaint structures, training, and/or monitoring mechanisms’” (quoting Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ 
Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 463 (N.J. 1993))).  
 54. See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 
2000) (holding that because the employer’s well-publicized harassment policy specified the 
proper channels for harassment complaints and the plaintiff did not follow those channels, 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s harassment could not be imputed to the defendant employer); 
Giuliani v. Stuart Corp., 512 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“When companies in-
stitute written policies established to deal intelligently with allegations of sexual harass-
ment, it is more likely that management will be informed of any impropriety occurring 
within the company. Companies that fail to institute such policies will naturally find 
themselves vulnerable to the likelihood that knowledge will be imputed to them.”). 
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harassment policies, and diversity training may all constitute evi-
dence of a proper response to the harassment.55  
 The cases in which the employer’s harassment policies and proce-
dures will be most relevant, however, are cases of supervisor hostile 
environment harassment of which the employer was unaware. In 
such cases, the employer is held vicariously liable unless it can estab-
lish a two-part affirmative defense: “(a) that the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harass-
ing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed 
to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”56 
 In adopting the two-pronged affirmative defense, the Supreme 
Court declined to require antiharassment policies and compliance 
procedures as a matter of law and never stated that such policies, 
standing alone, are sufficient to insulate employers from liability for 
supervisor hostile environment harassment. The Court did, however, 
highlight the importance of antiharassment policies and internal 
complaint procedures in establishing the first prong of the defense, 
stating that 
[w]hile proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharass-
ment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every in-
stance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to 
                                                                                                                    
 55. See, e.g., Idusuyi v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., No. 00-6324, 2002 WL 
220640, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2002) (holding that the employer was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law on its affirmative defense because it had a policy prohibiting sexual 
harassment, a complaint procedure that the plaintiff failed to use, and a two-hour training 
session on sexual harassment); Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 244 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (“An employer’s adoption of an effective anti-harassment policy is an important 
factor in determining whether it exercised reasonable care to prevent any sexually harass-
ing behavior.”); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that if “there is 
no evidence that an employer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad 
faith or that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional, the existence of such a 
policy militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that the employer ‘exercised reasonable 
care to prevent’ and promptly correct sexual harassment” (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998))); Citroner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 
328, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent 
racial harassment because it had adopted an “antiharassment policy with a complaint pro-
cedure, the Code of Conduct and Open Door Policy”). 
 56. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (adopting the same 
standard). The second prong of the Supreme Court’s test has been criticized at length by 
legal commentators and social scientists, who argue that victims of sexual harassment 
rarely utilize internal complaint procedures for a variety of reasons that are entirely rea-
sonable. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment—
Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bi-
som-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 181-85 (2001) (noting that survey data re-
veals that only two to fifteen percent of sexual harassment victims utilize employers’ in-
ternal complaint procedures for reasons that include the following: beliefs that informal 
avenues are more effective; fear of blame, retaliation, or not being believed; and concerns 
regarding the effectiveness of internal complaint procedures). 
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the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in 
any case when litigating the first element of the defense.57 
 Many lower courts, however, seem to have gone much further, 
treating EEO-related internal compliance structures as both neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for liability avoidance. For example, 
some lower courts have treated antiharassment policies and internal 
complaint procedures as, in and of themselves, legally sufficient to 
establish the reasonableness of the employer’s attempts to prevent or 
correct harassment.58 Similarly, many lower courts have seemed to 
treat internal compliance structures as a necessary condition for li-
ability avoidance, ruling that employers without such structures 
cannot establish the affirmative defense.59 
 Although the true extent to which EEO-related internal compli-
ance structures result in systematic differences in the rate and 
amount of employer liability is an empirical question that has not 
fully been answered, two points are clear.60 First, legal compliance 
professionals have cleverly, but predictably, packaged EEO internal 
compliance structures into absolute necessities for employers hoping 
to avoid huge liabilities.61 Second, there has been an increasing em-
                                                                                                                    
 57. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 58. See, e.g., Perry, 184 F.3d at 396 (stating that if “there is no evidence that an em-
ployer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy 
was otherwise defective or dysfunctional, the existence of such a policy militates strongly 
in favor of a conclusion that the employer ‘exercised reasonable care to prevent’ and 
promptly correct sexual harassment” (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807)); Citroner, 208 F. 
Supp. 2d at 341 (holding that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent racial 
harassment because it had adopted an antiharassment policy and a complaint procedure); 
see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable Em-
brace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 T. JEFFERSON 
L. REV. 125, 141 (2002) (discussing the role of harassment training in lower court decisions 
after Ellerth and Faragher). 
 59. See, e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding, as a matter 
of law, that defendant employer “could never show that it had exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior” because “it had no policy specifically 
aimed at sexual harassment,” only a nondiscrimination policy). 
 60. Lauren Edelman provides some evidence on this point in an empirical study con-
ducted shortly after the decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986), 
which replaced the existing standard of strict vicarious liability with a duty-based liability 
standard. Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Pro-
cedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 440 (1999). At the time of the study, only 
116 cases raising the grievance procedure affirmative defense had been decided since Meri-
tor. Id. at 440. Of those 116 cases, ninety-one percent indicated that a well-crafted internal 
grievance procedure would insulate the employer from liability, and in thirty-six of those 
ninety-one percent of cases, the employer’s grievance procedures did insulate the company 
from liability. Id. Furthermore, Edelman found that courts were becoming increasingly 
willing to defer to employers’ grievance procedures when assessing liability. Id. at 442. If 
true, the percentage of cases in which the employer’s EEO internal compliance structures 
provide insulation from liability could be much higher today.   
 61. See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 33, at 163 (stating that “the liability standards in the 
EEO field . . . make compliance program quality the key to reducing certain forms of em-
ployer liability”); Ellen McLaughlin & Carol Merchasin, Training Becomes Important Step 
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phasis during litigation on the employer’s internal compliance struc-
tures, with plaintiffs’ lawyers and the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission seeking to determine how much money the em-
ployer has spent on such structures, the content of training sessions, 
and the expertise of diversity trainers and human resources person-
nel.62 
IV.   DETERRENCE UNDER INTERNAL COMPLIANCE-BASED LIABILITY 
REGIMES 
 Unfortunately, the empirical evidence regarding the role of inter-
nal compliance structures in reducing organizational misconduct 
provides little reason to approach with enthusiasm the U.S. legal 
system’s movement to internal compliance-based organizational li-
ability regimes. Surprisingly little empirical evidence exists regard-
ing the effectiveness of internal compliance structures in deterring 
organizational misconduct—a disturbing fact given the legal regime’s 
heavy reliance on such structures as a liability determinant. Even 
more disturbing, however, is the fact that the evidence that does ex-
ist is decidedly mixed, with many of the most recent and methodol-
ogically sound studies finding no significant correlation between the 
most widely used internal compliance structures and reduced organ-
izational misconduct. 
 This Part analyzes the empirical evidence regarding three types of 
internal compliance structures on which the U.S. legal regime places 
special reliance: ethics or conduct codes, the OSG-recommended in-
ternal compliance structures, and diversity or harassment training. 
As will be shown, there is insufficient empirical evidence to conclude 
that any of these mechanisms deter organizational misconduct. 
A.   Ethics Codes 
 Despite the pervasiveness of ethics codes in corporate America 
and the importance ascribed to them by the U.S. legal regime, little 
evidence exists to support the theory that ethics codes modify em-
ployee behavior. Although some studies do find a significant relation-
ship between ethics codes and employee conduct, they are plagued 
with methodological problems, such as a failure to query respondents 
on or identify modified behavior due to ethics codes (as opposed to 
merely asking respondents whether they believe that ethics codes are 
                                                                                                                    
to Avoid Liability, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B10 (“[E]ngaging in quality training in con-
junction with a well-written policy will likely translate into successfully meeting the good-
faith defense of Kolstad.”); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 58, at 139 (quoting training advocates 
and attorneys as stating that Ellerth and Faragher require harassment training and that 
such training will insulate employers from liability).  
 62. McLaughlin & Merchasin, supra note 61. 
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an important factor affecting behavior), a reliance on hypothetical di-
lemmas in lab settings (as opposed to observing actual conduct in an 
employment setting), and a sole reliance on self-reporting.63  
 Furthermore, these findings are contradicted by a large number of 
studies finding no significant relationship between ethics codes and 
employee conduct.64 Typical of these is a recent study in which re-
spondents were unable to provide specific examples of instances in 
which employees had altered their behavior due to ethics codes, 
overwhelmingly indicated that their employers’ conduct codes had 
not altered their conduct, and asserted that they had never referred 
to their employers’ conduct codes.65 
 Of course, ethics codes are only one type of internal compliance 
structure and, moreover, are a very superficial one. Perhaps re-
searchers have been unable to document a link between ethics codes 
and ethical conduct because supporting compliance structures, such 
as those required by the OSG, are necessary to deter organizational 
misconduct. 
B.   The OSG 
 Unfortunately, very little research has attempted to verify 
whether the assumption underlying the OSG (that internal compli-
ance structures such as those recommended in the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual reduce the incidence of organizational miscon-
                                                                                                                    
 63. See, e.g., Alan Kitson, Taking the Pulse: Ethics and the British Cooperative Bank, 
15 J. BUS. ETHICS 1021 (1996) (interviews with seventeen bank managers); Donald L. 
McCabe et al., The Influence of Collegiate and Corporate Codes of Conduct on Ethics-
Related Behavior in the Workplace, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 461 (1996) (questionnaire to 328 col-
lege graduates); Margaret Anne Pierce & John W. Henry, Computer Ethics: The Role of 
Personal, Informal, and Formal Codes, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 425 (1996) (questionnaire re-
sponses from 356 data-processing management professionals). 
 64. See, e.g., Jeff Allen & Duane Davis, Assessing Some Determinant Effects of Ethical 
Consulting Behavior: The Case of Personal and Professional Values, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 449 
(1993) (questionnaire survey of 207 national business consultants); Joseph L. Badaracco, 
Jr. & Allen P. Webb, Business Ethics: A View from the Trenches, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 
1995, at 8 (interviews with thirty middle managers); Arthur P. Brief et al., What’s Wrong 
with the Treadway Commission Report? Experimental Analyses of the Effects of Personal 
Values and Codes of Conduct on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 183 
(1996) (questionnaires and experiment with nearly 400 executives and controllers); Victor 
J. Callan, Predicting Ethical Values and Training Needs in Ethics, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 761 
(1992) (questionnaires from 226 state government employees); Margaret Anne Cleek & 
Sherry Lynn Leonard, Can Corporate Codes of Ethics Influence Behavior?, 17 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 619 (1998) (questionnaires from 150 graduate and undergraduate business stu-
dents). However, many of these studies suffer from the same methodological problems that 
beset those studies finding a significant relationship between ethics codes and employee 
conduct. 
 65. M. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship Between Corporate Codes of Ethics 
and Behaviour, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 247, 253 (2001) (concluding that although ethics codes 
may have the potential to alter employee behavior, “this appears to take place on very rare 
occasions”). 
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duct) withstands empirical testing. In fact, only three large-scale 
studies seek systematically to test the assumptions of the OSG rec-
ommendations.66 None of the studies supported the hypothesis that 
the OSG-recommended internal compliance structures deter illegal 
conduct. 
 Indeed, two of the studies found unanticipated positive correla-
tions between internal compliance structures and legal violations. 
The study authors attributed these findings to the possibility that in-
ternal compliance structures, such as those recommended by the 
OSG, may serve primarily a window-dressing function designed only 
to reduce legal liability.67 
C.   Diversity and Harassment Training 
 Finally, due to Supreme Court and lower court interpretations of 
EEO law, diversity training (including harassment training) has be-
come an increasingly common type of internal compliance structure. 
A 1998 study by the Society for Human Resource Management, for 
example, found that seventy-five percent of Fortune 500 firms and 
thirty-six percent of other firms have a diversity training program of 
some sort.68  
 Nonetheless, there is little empirical support for the proposition 
that diversity training reduces discriminatory conduct. In a recent 
working paper, Katerina Bezrukova and Karen Jehn of the Wharton 
School reviewed twenty empirical studies published in major man-
agement, psychological, and sociological journals and concluded that 
“[h]aving reviewed the available empirical studies on the effects of 
                                                                                                                    
 66. See M. Cash Mathews, Codes of Ethics: Organizational Behavior and Misbehavior, 
in 9 RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY 107, 108-09, 125 (William 
C. Frederick & Lee E. Preston eds., 1987) (examining the incidence of civil and administra-
tive actions taken by four federal regulatory agencies against 485 corporations from 1973 
through 1980 and concluding that “there is little relationship between codes of conduct 
[and their enforcement mechanisms] and corporate violations”); McKendall et al., supra 
note 30 (implementing a longitudinal study finding that the presence of OSG-
recommended compliance structures do not reduce the incidence of OSHA violations); 
Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, III, Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate Il-
legality, 8 ORG. SCI. 624 (1997). 
 67. Mathews, supra note 66, at 125-26 (finding a positive correlation between certain 
aspects of conduct code content—such as codes that require compliance affidavits by em-
ployees or that mention “maintaining the reputation of the corporation”—and the number 
of legal violations and concluding that “[p]erhaps executives in law-abiding corporations do 
not feel the need to convince others of their ‘good reputation’”); McKendall et al., supra 
note 30, at 380 (finding a positive correlation between the OSG-recommended internal 
compliance structures and the incidence of willful and repeat OSHA violations and con-
cluding that, because willful and repeat violations are the type most likely to include sen-
ior management involvement or knowledge, organizations may be using the OSG-
recommended internal compliance structures to hide management involvement in, or re-
duce organizational liability for, purposeful illegal activity). 
 68. Richard S. Allen & Kendyl A. Montgomery, Applying an Organizational Develop-
ment Approach to Creating Diversity, 30 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 149, 149 (2001). 
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diversity training programs in corporations and on campuses it is ob-
vious that it is too soon to draw any comprehensive conclusions.”69 
Although much of the empirical research reviewed by Professors 
Bezrukova and Jehn identified improvements in diversity training 
participants’ awareness of diversity issues,70 only one of the studies 
documented sustained attitudinal or behavioral changes.71  
 Similarly, in the most comprehensive study of diversity training 
and other EEO compliance measures ever undertaken, Alexandra 
Kalev, Frank Dobbin, and Erin Kelley combine survey information 
on affirmative action and diversity programs from more than 800 
American employers with annual federal data on their workforce 
composition from 1971 to 1999.72 As a general rule, organizations 
                                                                                                                    
 69. Katerina Bezrukova & Karen A. Jehn, The Effects of Diversity Training Programs 
16 (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 70. Id. at 10-11; see also Heidi Tarr Henson, Gauging the Outcomes of Organizational 
Diversity Implementations: The Intersection of Attitudes, Awareness and Behavior, 60 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 2325 (2000) (finding that diversity training achieved an 
awareness of diversity issues but did not result in attitudinal changes); Dick Wallace 
Kracht, Diversity Training Among Manufacturing Companies: Reaction and Learning in a 
For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Work Environment, 59 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 2345 
(1999) (finding an increase in perceived learning among 141 employees after diversity 
training); Dana Yavette Law, An Evaluation of a Cultural Diversity Training Program, 59 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 2468 (1998) (finding improved awareness of diversity is-
sues in training group relative to control group); Jean A. Mausehund et al., Diversity 
Training: Effects of an Intervention Treatment on Nonverbal Awareness, BUS. COMM. Q., 
Mar. 1995, at 27 (finding a positive link between diversity training and awareness of non-
verbal factors in interpersonal communications between people from different cultures); 
David L. Tan et al., Changes in Attitude After Diversity Training, TRAINING & DEV., Sept. 
1996, at 54 (finding a significant increase in diversity awareness in 739 managers after di-
versity training workshops).  
 71. See Bezrukova & Jehn, supra note 69, at 11-13. Compare Taylor Cox, Jr., The 
Multicultural Organization, ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, May 1991, at 34, 45 (finding that 
“Race Relations Competence Workshops” resulted in more positive attitudes toward Afri-
can Americans and better interrace relations among workshop participants), with Sara 
Rynes & Benson Rosen, What Makes Diversity Programs Work?, H.R. MAG., Oct. 1994, at 
67 (surveying 785 members of the Society for Human Resource Management and finding 
positive short-term impact of diversity training on attitudes but less positive long-term 
benefits), Diane Marie Govern, The Effect of Diversity Awareness Training on Oral Presen-
tation Ratings, 58 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L 5681 (1998) (finding no correlation be-
tween diversity training and ratings of oral presentations by black and white police ser-
geant candidates), and Henson, supra note 70, at 2325 (finding no attitudinal change in 
respondents from diversity training). Bezrukova and Jehn reviewed five studies that tested 
the impact of diversity training programs on college campuses. Bezrukova & Jehn, supra 
note 69, at 12. Three of the studies found a small positive correlation between diversity 
training and attitudes toward ethnic minorities. However, the authors attributed this 
variation to self-selection bias, rather than to a real change in attitudes. Id. at 12-13.   
 Further compromising the effectiveness of diversity training are two factors: first, the 
backlash that may result; and, second, the attempt to “sterilize” diversity training sessions 
in anticipation of the fact that statements made may be admitted as evidence during litiga-
tion. Krawiec, supra note 21, at 515 nn.96-97 (discussing the evidence on backlash and 
sterilization of training sessions). 
 72. Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, Two to Tango: Affirmative Action, Diver-
sity Programs and Women and African-Americans in Management 2 (unpublished draft), avail-
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that implemented diversity training programs aimed at individuals 
did not significantly improve managerial diversity and, in fact, 
tended to significantly decrease the odds of women in management 
positions.73 Although the authors did find that some affirmative ac-
tion and diversity measures (especially those programs designed to 
“couple” rhetoric regarding diversity goals with activities designed to 
promote diversity) had significant, positive impacts on the odds of 
women and minorities in management, particularly at employers 
that are government contractors, they conclude that diversity meas-
ures designed to counter managerial bias, including diversity train-
ing, are least effective.74 
 In the end, Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly conclude that at least some 
types of EEO internal compliance structures can enhance diversity, if 
coupled with legal accountability.75 Their study demonstrates, how-
ever, how much we have yet to learn about the impacts of EEO com-
pliance structures on different demographic groups and the circum-
stances under which even the most promising EEO compliance struc-
tures can be expected to combat discrimination. In the rapid move to 
internal compliance-based organizational liability, however, such dis-
tinctions appear to have been uniformly ignored. 
 As extensively discussed by Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp, the em-
pirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of sexual harassment 
training is equally sparse.76 As noted by two researchers in the field, 
                                                                                                                    
able at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~dobbin/cv/unpublished/2004_aapractices_kalev.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2005). 
 73. Id. at 28. With respect to all employers, diversity training had a significant, nega-
tive impact on the odds of black women in management positions and no significant impact 
on the odds of white women and black men in management positions. Id. at 53 tbl.2. How-
ever, when the data are broken down into the impact of diversity training at government 
contractors (who are subject to affirmative action obligations) versus noncontractors, di-
versity training among the latter is shown to have a significant, negative impact on the 
odds of both white and black women in management positions, while failing to significantly 
impact the odds of black men. Id. at 54 tbl.3. In contrast, among employers that are gov-
ernment contractors, diversity training had a significant, positive impact on the odds of 
white women in management positions, while failing to impact the odds of black men or 
black women. Id. 
 74. Id. at 28-29, 31, 37. Many diversity measures impacted different demographic 
groups differently. For example, a program or measure might improve the odds of white 
women in management while at the same time negatively impacting or failing to signifi-
cantly impact the odds of black men in management. Id. at 53 tbl.2, 54 tbl.3. However, as a 
general rule, measures designed to combat the “decoupling” of diversity rhetoric from ac-
tion (such as affirmative action plans, diversity committees, and diversity staff positions) 
enhanced managerial diversity more than other measures did. Id. at 28. In addition, the ef-
fectiveness of different measures varied across type of employer: diversity measures tended 
to be more effective at government contractors, who are subject to affirmative action obli-
gations, than at noncontractors. Id. at 30-32. 
 75. Id. at 38. 
 76. Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of 
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employ-
ment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 31-38 (2001) [hereinafter Bi-
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“[T]he unpleasant empirical truth is that almost nothing is known 
about the effects of sexual harassment education and training pro-
grams.”77 Given the dearth of research on the effects of sexual har-
assment training, many social scientists are alarmed at the unwaver-
ing commitment of employers and compliance professionals to har-
assment training.78 
 Moreover, the existing research on the effects of harassment 
training fails to support the hypothesis that harassment training al-
ters employee conduct. Although some studies do support the notion 
that harassment training increases trainees’ awareness of potential 
instances of harassment, many researchers doubt that the training 
has long-term effects on attitudes or behavior.79 
D.   Summary 
 In sum, the data regarding the effectiveness of internal compli-
ance-based organizational liability regimes is both preliminary and 
disturbing. First, the fact that the U.S. legal regime has so quickly 
transitioned to internal compliance-based liability regimes based on 
such limited and conflicting evidence is troubling. Existing studies 
are insufficient in number, methodology, and scope to warrant such a 
move. Nonetheless, this trend should not be surprising, given the po-
litical influence of those who benefit most from an internal compli-
ance-based liability regime—organizational defendants and the legal 
compliance professionals who serve them.  
 Perhaps more importantly, the evidence that does exist regarding 
the effectiveness of internal compliance-based liability regimes sug-
gests that many types of widely used internal compliance structures 
currently considered to demonstrate good-faith organizational at-
tempts to comply with the law are ineffective at reducing organiza-
tional misconduct. Even the Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study, which 
concludes that EEO internal compliance structures can enhance 
EEO compliance under some circumstances,80 demonstrates the dan-
gers of an ill-conceived internal compliance-based liability regime. If 
that regime rewards organizations even for those compliance meas-
ures that decouple compliance rhetoric from compliance activity or 
                                                                                                                    
som-Rapp, Ounce] (reviewing some existing studies); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing 
the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 967-76 (1999) (arguing that many employers adopt minimally dis-
ruptive symbolic compliance policies and procedures that result in little, if any, substantive 
change in the employment environment); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 58, at 142-44. 
 77. Robert S. Moyer & Anjan Nath, Some Effects of Brief Training Interventions on 
Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 334 (1998). 
 78. Bisom-Rapp, supra note 58, at 142-43 (pointing out two reasons why it may be 
dangerous to implement such training without sufficient information). 
 79. Id. at 143-44. 
 80. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. 
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that have been shown to be of limited effectiveness, then such a re-
gime may fail to accomplish—and may even thwart—the goal of re-
ducing organizational misconduct.81  
 In short, given the theoretical problems inherent in internal com-
pliance-based liability regimes discussed in Part II of this Article and 
the large and politically powerful interest groups that stand to bene-
fit from such a regime, defenders of the move to internal compliance-
based organizational liability systems should bear the burden of 
proving the effectiveness of internal compliance structures in reduc-
ing organizational misconduct. The analysis of the available empiri-
cal evidence detailed in this Part indicates that this burden has not 
been met. 
V.   EXPLAINING THE ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY REGIME 
 Why does the law place so much reliance on factors, such as inter-
nal compliance structures, that appear to have little impact on the 
incidence of organizational misconduct? This Part explores two pos-
sible explanations: (1) an overreliance on principal-agent models of 
organizational misconduct and (2) public-choice explanations. 
A.   Principal-Agent Models of Misconduct 
 One potential explanation for the legal regime’s heavy reliance on in-
ternal compliance structures as a liability determinant is an overreli-
ance on principal-agent models of organizational misconduct.82 In other 
words, current legal theory largely assumes that misconduct within or-
ganizations results from the acts of single, independent agents who dis-
regard the preferences of shareholder principals and their representa-
tives—the board of directors and senior management.83 In the more so-
                                                                                                                    
 81. The Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study also demonstrates that even when internal 
compliance structures provide some positive results, they may be accompanied by unin-
tended negative consequences. For example, some diversity measures appeared to benefit 
one demographic group at the expense of another, although both groups were the ostensi-
ble beneficiaries of the measures. See Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 72, at 33, 53 tbl.2, 
54 tbl.3 (finding that some diversity measures increase the odds of management positions 
for one minority demographic group, while decreasing it for one or more other minority 
demographic groups). 
 82. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 2, at 834 (“These agents are rational self-interested 
utility maximizers who commit crimes in order to benefit themselves. In pursuit of his own 
self-interest an agent may commit a crime that incidentally benefits the corporation, but 
this is not its purpose.”); Kevin B. Huff, The Role of Corporate Compliance Programs in De-
termining Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1252, 
1288-89 (1996); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response 
to Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 19 n.82 (2002) (criticizing the 
view of organizational misconduct as the behavior of a single, errant agent). 
 83. In the majority of large organizations in which organizational misconduct is de-
tected, active participation in or direct knowledge of the misconduct is rarely attributable 
to senior management and even more rarely to the board of directors. 
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phisticated version of this argument, even when misconduct is under-
taken in order to enhance corporate profitability or performance, the 
primary motivation is to promote or safeguard the careers of the agents 
undertaking the misconduct.84 
 If the law overrelies on principal-agent models of organizational 
misconduct, then one can see why the legal system might place too 
much emphasis on internal compliance structures as a liability de-
terminant. If organizational misconduct is simply an agency cost 
problem, then internal compliance structures—such as internal 
monitoring and reporting, employee training, and conduct codes—
might reduce such problems by increasing the ease with which 
shareholder principals (through senior management and boards of 
directors) can monitor employee and mid-level management agents.85 
 Unfortunately, however, organizational misconduct is much more 
complicated than this. The simple principal-agent model of organiza-
tional misconduct embodied in much legal theory conflates the con-
cepts of what sociologists refer to as organizational misconduct—
conduct undertaken at least in part to benefit the organization—and 
occupational misconduct—conduct undertaken solely to benefit the 
perpetrator and from which the organization derives no benefit.86 In-
deed, the organization may actually be the victim of occupational 
misconduct, as in the case of embezzlement, for example. 
 Because the agent derives no direct benefit from organizational 
misconduct, the personal benefits from such actions must derive from 
increased pay, status, or job security—benefits resulting from the 
appearance of organizational profitability caused by the miscon-
duct.87 Unless organizational agents systematically miscalculate the 
probability that organizational misconduct will positively impact the 
bottom line, then, by definition, their conduct must create real or ap-
parent profits. Real profits in excess of real costs will, of course, al-
ways benefit shareholder principals. In addition, the creation of ap-
parent profits will sometimes benefit shareholder principals. There-
fore, as discussed below, the category of actions that represent 
                                                                                                                    
 84. Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 
71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 319 (1991). 
 85. By focusing on the costs and benefits of organizational misconduct to sharehold-
ers, I do not mean to imply that other organizational stakeholders are unaffected by such 
actions. Indeed, as demonstrated by recent events at Enron and Arthur Andersen, often 
low-level employees, creditors, and other stakeholders far removed from the misconduct in 
question are greatly harmed by organizational misconduct. 
 86. See supra note 1 for sources defining organizational misconduct. 
 87. See Adrian E. Tschoegl, The Key to Risk Management: Management, in RISK 
MANAGEMENT: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY 103 (Michael Frenkel et al. eds., 2000) (ar-
guing that the academic finance and management literature has failed to develop a suffi-
cient understanding of organizational misbehavior because it is overly focused on agency 
cost explanations when, in many of the most high-profile misconduct examples, the agent’s 
incentives were aligned with those of his or her firm, at least in the beginning). 
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attempts to increase shareholder-principal welfare may be larger 
than is typically assumed. These actions thus are not properly char-
acterized as principal-agent problems. 
 Specifically, a simple agency cost model of organizational miscon-
duct is incomplete in at least two ways. First, a model of organiza-
tional misconduct that treats agent misdeeds as the feat of a lone in-
dividual actor ignores the role played by the organizational system in 
shaping that conduct. Second, organizational misconduct may benefit 
organizational profitability and performance (and thus shareholder 
welfare) in subtle and difficult-to-quantify ways, which means that 
organizational management (even when acting as the loyal agents of 
shareholder owners) may have reasons to tolerate such behavior that 
are not immediately obvious. 
1.   Organizational Environment 
 For many years now, researchers who study human behavior have 
been aware of the powerful role played by environment, including or-
ganizational environment, in shaping individual perceptions and ac-
tions. Yet many legal scholars, and the legal system itself, stead-
fastly ignore any responsibility by those who create that climate for 
the acts of errant agents, except to the extent that other organiza-
tional actors were actually aware of or contributed to the misconduct. 
 Yet, senior management, through the organizational climate that 
it creates, plays an important role in shaping agent conduct. Al-
though senior management shapes the organizational environment 
(and thus employee conduct) in many ways, at least three mecha-
nisms have been extensively studied: organizational culture, incen-
tive and reward systems, and management’s commitment to ethical 
conduct.88 For example, a climate in which employees are encouraged 
to pursue or are rewarded for pursuing the bottom line even at the 
expense of breaking laws or the company’s conduct code is more 
likely to produce agents who violate laws and conduct codes.89 Simi-
                                                                                                                    
 88. Other individual (that is, personal values), organizational (for example, organiza-
tion size, decentralization, and financial distress), and industry (for example, concentra-
tion) factors have also been shown to impact organizational misconduct rates. See, e.g., 
McKendall & Wagner, supra note 66, at 644 (finding that organizational size, structure, 
complexity, and industry concentration are significant factors impacting the incidence of 
corporate illegality); McKendall et al., supra note 30, at 368, 376 (discussing earlier studies 
that proposed that illegal activity is more likely in firms facing financial pressure and find-
ing that lower firm profitability is positively associated with firm OSHA violations). 
 89. See, e.g., Allen & Davis, supra note 64, at 456 (finding that corporate culture and 
reward systems—rather than mere ethics codes—impact employee behavior); Anita Jose & 
Mary S. Thibodeaux, Institutionalization of Ethics: The Perspective of Managers, 22 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 133, 138 (1999) (finding that 98.8% of managers surveyed ranked top management 
support and that 93% ranked corporate culture as more important than other factors such 
as conduct codes and training programs in encouraging ethical corporate conduct). 
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larly, lower-level employees are likely to take their cues regarding 
what behavior is acceptable from senior management and coworkers. 
Agents who believe that management’s commitment to the obser-
vance of laws and organizational rules is symbolic rather than real 
are more likely to disregard those laws and rules.90 
 Finally, the compensation and reward system employed by man-
agement may greatly affect employee behavior. Rewards and pun-
ishments that are performance-based and fail to properly account for 
the method by which performance goals are attained are likely to re-
sult in more violations than a reward and punishment system that 
more carefully accounts for the means by which performance goals 
are attained.91 
 I am not asserting that, as a general rule, organizational liability 
regimes should attempt to account for factors related to the incidence 
of organizational misconduct—such as organizational culture, incen-
tive and reward systems, and management’s commitment to ethical 
actions—by directly incorporating them into liability, sanctioning, or 
prosecutorial determinations.92 Like determinations regarding the ef-
fectiveness of internal compliance structures, an analysis of these 
factors by legal decisionmakers is likely to be difficult, costly, and 
fraught with errors.93 Nor am I attempting to exonerate culpable in-
                                                                                                                    
 90. See supra note 12 for sources discussing the importance of managerial attitudes 
and behavior in deterring organizational misconduct. 
 91. Allen & Davis, supra note 64, at 456 (finding that organizational reward systems 
significantly impact employee behavior); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the 
Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The 
Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 34-40 (2003) (discussing organizational 
reward and compensation systems). 
 92. Lawmakers have on several occasions demonstrated an awareness that factors 
such as organizational culture and reward systems may contribute to organizational mis-
conduct. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT OF THE AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP ON 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 54 (2003) [hereinafter AD HOC REPORT] 
(urging organizations to “promote an organizational culture that encourages a commitment to 
compliance with the law”), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/AG_Final.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2005); News Release, SEC, SEC Chairman Levitt Receives Compensa-
tion Committee’s Report Highlighting Industry ‘Best Practices’; Calls on Entire Industry to 
Review Closely (Apr. 10, 1995) (warning that the compensation system used by many bro-
ker-dealers provides incentives to churn customer accounts and recommend unsuitable in-
vestments), available at 1995 WL 154267. 
 93. There are likely to be some instances where the connection between organiza-
tional incentive systems and organizational misconduct is quite clear. One commonly cited 
example is the complaint brought against Sears, Roebuck & Company by consumers and 
attorneys general in more than forty states. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organ-
izational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 107. In an attempt to revive 
lagging sales in its automotive service centers, Sears management imposed minimum work 
quotas, productivity incentives, product-specific sales quotas, paid its automotive service 
salesmen and mechanics with commissions based on sales, and exerted considerable pres-
sure on automotive center employees to perform more work. Id. Predictably, many employ-
ees responded by defrauding customers through sales of unnecessary parts and services. 
Id. at 108. Sears eventually settled the suits for sixty million dollars. Id. 
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dividual actors by suggesting that a focus on the environment that 
contributed to their misconduct is warranted. Instead, my goal is 
simply to demonstrate the extraordinary amount of influence that 
the organization (through senior management) has on the level of 
misconduct in its ranks—an influence that is obscured by perceptions 
of organizational misconduct as an agency cost problem stemming 
from the acts of individual deviant agents. 
2.   Misconduct and Organizational Performance 
 In addition, many legal scholars assume, either implicitly or ex-
plicitly, that many forms of agent misconduct provide no potential 
benefits to the organization itself. My goal in this Part, however, is to 
provide several examples of conduct typically thought to provide no 
organizational benefits and to demonstrate the circumstances under 
which this assumption may be false. I do not offer conclusive proof 
that such misconduct positively impacts the bottom line; the research 
in this area is too preliminary to warrant such a conclusion. Instead, 
my goal is simply to induce greater skepticism toward the claim that 
these actions necessarily reflect the isolated misconduct of a single or 
small group of deviant agents who have succeeded—despite man-
agement’s best efforts—to violate laws or company policies. 
 Some incidents of agent misconduct provide such obvious poten-
tial benefits for the firm that the inevitable organizational disavow-
als of such conduct as the acts of a deviant or “rogue” employee 
should be viewed with immediate skepticism.94 The most recent 
variation on this scenario has arisen in connection with the recent 
mutual fund scandal. For example, in early November 2003, state 
and federal authorities charged seven former Prudential employees 
with securities fraud in connection with mutual fund market-timing 
trades on behalf of large hedge fund clients but did not charge Pru-
dential or its senior management team. The brokers claimed, how-
ever, that both management and the firm’s compliance department 
were fully aware of the trades and rewarded the brokers handsomely 
for the fees they brought in.95 
                                                                                                                    
 94. Paine, supra note 93, at 106 (noting that business “executives are quick to de-
scribe any wrongdoing as an isolated incident, the work of a rogue employee,” but that 
“unethical business practice involves the tacit, if not explicit, cooperation of others and re-
flects the values, attitudes, beliefs, language, and behavioral patterns that define an or-
ganization’s operating culture”). 
 95. David Barboza, Brokers Say Prudential Approved Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2003, at C1. According to the Massachusetts Securities Division, charges may be brought 
against Prudential if it appears that high-level executives knew about or sanctioned the il-
licit trades. Id. As previously stated, however, such direct knowledge of or participation in 
organizational misconduct by senior management is extremely rare. Instead, the far more 
typical situation occurs when management creates an environment in which such conduct 
is encouraged and rewarded. Often, the most that can be concluded is that management 
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 Other forms of organizational misconduct, however, may provide 
less obvious organizational benefits. This Part discusses three exam-
ples of agent misconduct that, at first blush, seem to provide no po-
tential benefits for shareholder principals: “rogue” trading, discrimi-
nation, and financial fraud. 
(a)   Rogue Trading 
 “Rogue,” or unauthorized, trading may appear to be a classic ex-
ample of occupational—as opposed to organizational—misconduct 
that causes only harm to the corporate enterprise, as evidenced by 
the many large and highly publicized rogue trading losses through-
out the years. This perception of rogue-trading as isolated incidences 
of occupational misconduct is reinforced by the presence of extensive 
written conduct codes and costly compliance programs apparently 
designed to deter unauthorized trading. However, the same envi-
ronment that gives rise to rogue trading may also foster other 
traits—for example, greed, independence, and risk-taking—that re-
sult in more profitable traders.96 As a result, shareholder principals 
may be willing to tolerate some rogue-trading losses, so long as they 
are offset by the benefits of a more profitable trading floor. 
 First, traders tend to have a heightened sense of materialism, be-
cause the trading floor climate is designed to foster such an atti-
tude.97 Rather than rewarding successful traders with impressive ti-
tles or moves up the career ladder, the trading floor hierarchy tends 
to consist only of traders who earn more money for the firm and re-
ceive higher bonuses, versus traders who earn less.98   
                                                                                                                    
set up a system that allowed or encouraged the misconduct to take place, then took steps to 
remain willfully ignorant of the behavior. See, e.g., id. (discussing vacations, bonuses, and 
management praise bestowed on the indicted brokers due to the large commissions earned 
on their hedge fund accounts). 
 96. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader 
Mystery, 79 OR. L. REV. 301, 316 (2000) (arguing that some financial institutions have 
made a conscious decision to foster an organizational climate that gives rise to at least 
some rogue trading, because to do so may maximize trading floor profits, and thus man-
agement compensation and status). The problem is likely exacerbated by a variety of be-
havioral factors, including the tendency to trust those whom we have trusted in the past. 
Because the events that give rise to large rogue-trading losses involve serial decisionmak-
ing and substantial sunk costs, supervisors and others within the firm may tend toward an 
irrational escalation of commitment. Id. 
 97. MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA, MAKING MARKETS: OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRAINT ON WALL 
STREET 18, 30 (1996). “Money is more than just the medium of exchange; it is a measure of 
one’s ‘winnings.’ It provides an identity that prevails over charisma, physical attractive-
ness, or sociability as the arbiter of success and power on the bond trading floor. The top-
earning trader is king of the mountain.” Id. at 30. 
 98. Krawiec, supra note 96, at 329. 
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 Second, only individuals comfortable with taking large risks are 
attracted to, and survive in, trading floor jobs.99 The compensation 
structure at most trading institutions, which is based almost exclu-
sively on trading profits earned in the current fiscal year, exacer-
bates this attitude by sending a message that short-term profitability 
will be rewarded even if incurred at the cost of taking greater 
risks.100 The high number of largely unsuccessful attempts by finan-
cial institutions to revise traders’ compensation packages indicates 
that managers of financial institutions are aware of the potentially 
perverse incentives being created but have yet to find a mechanism 
for eradicating them that is compatible with encouraging the most 
profitable trading strategies.101 
 Finally, traders tend to be self-reliant and entrepreneurial, oper-
ating in an independent and often uncooperative environment. As a 
result, traders may view their primary obligation as maximizing the 
value of their own account and, thus, feel little duty to supervise 
those around them for potential violations of trading rules.102 
 Although these traits may contribute to rogue traders who violate 
the firm’s risk and loss limits, firms may tolerate—and even encour-
age—those traits because such tolerance also may create more prof-
                                                                                                                    
 99. The impact of organizational environment and selection processes on individual 
risk-taking attitudes and behavior has been a subject of study for many researchers. See, 
e.g., James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 
MGMT. SCI. 1404 (1987). March and Shapira explain that 
[a]lthough [managers] undoubtedly vary in their individual propensities to take 
risks, those variations are obscured by processes of selection that reduce the 
heterogeneity among managers and encourage them to believe in their ability 
to control the odds, by systems of organizational controls and incentives that 
dictate risk taking behavior in significant ways, and by variations in the de-
mand for risk taking produced by the context within which choice takes place. 
Id. at 1414. 
 100. Krawiec, supra note 96, at 330; When Words Are Not Bonds: Wall Street Pay, 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 1994, at 90 (stating that Wall Street “bonuses account for at least 
75% of total remuneration”). 
 101. For example, after its own rogue-trading scandal in 1994, Salomon Brothers at-
tempted to revise its compensation system by providing investment bankers, traders, and 
other employees with as much as half their pay in Salomon Brothers stock at a fifteen per-
cent discount, which could not be sold for five years. Michael Siconolfi, Salomon Looks at 
Backing Out of Pay Plan, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 1995, at C1. After the announcement, 
Salomon lost twenty of its two hundred managing directors, including several top traders. 
Id. The plan was discontinued. Id.; see also Pay Dirt: Salomon Brothers, ECONOMIST, July 
1, 1995, at 67. Attempts at such revisions by other financial institutions have met with a 
similar fate. See Bonus Points, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at 71 (discussing efforts at vari-
ous financial services firms to restructure their compensation systems in an effort to re-
duce agency costs and unauthorized activities). 
 102. See ABOLAFIA, supra note 97, at 28-29; Gordon L. Clark, Rogues and Regulation in 
Global Finance: Maxwell, Leeson and the City of London, 31 REGIONAL STUD. 221, 226 
(“The firm deliberately sets-off their traders one against the other, and from the firm’s own 
resources so that each trader’s performance can be directly compared; group-based or 
team-based organizational modes of trading are eschewed at this level of the firm in favour 
of a model which can identify and reward the best and the brightest.”). 
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itable traders. For example, a recent comparison of U.S. and Japa-
nese trading floors shows that U.S. trading firms tend to follow a 
“market control” pattern in which traders are given high authority, 
few risk or loss limits, and high incentive compensation.103 Japanese 
trading firms, by contrast, tend to follow a “bureaucratic control” pat-
tern under which traders have little discretion, strict risk and loss 
limits, low incentive compensation, and a high level of organizational 
control.104 The study found that the market-control firms were sig-
nificantly more profitable than their bureaucratic-control counter-
parts and were willing to tolerate higher levels of “acceptable risk.”105 
In other words, traders at market-control style firms had shared val-
ues regarding the acceptability of higher risk levels within the 
firm.106  
(b)   Discrimination 
 The notion that organizational diversity is “good for business” has 
become a common mantra both among organizational leaders and in 
the management literature.107 Accordingly, discrimination may ap-
pear at first blush a simple matter of individual employee deviance 
that cannot properly be characterized as organizational miscon-
duct.108 Unfortunately for those with hopes for a more diverse and in-
                                                                                                                    
 103. Srilata Zaheer, Acceptable Risk: A Study of Global Currency Trading Rooms in the 
US and Japan, in PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: EFFICIENCY, INNOVATION, 
REGULATION 462, 472, 489-91 (Patrick T. Harker & Stavros A. Zenios eds., 2000).  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 490. 
 106. Id. at 489-90. Interestingly, the market-control firms did not have significantly 
higher levels of actual risk. Id. at 490. This may not tell us much about the propensity for 
rogue trading, however. By definition, traders attempt to hide unauthorized trades from 
the formal control system, meaning that it may not have shown up in the study. Because 
the Zaheer study was not designed to and did not measure the incidence of trading viola-
tions within the firm, it cannot be used as evidence regarding the comparative levels of ac-
tual rogue trading within the two types of firms. However, the findings on profitability and 
acceptable risk levels are supportive of the notion that market-control-style firms may 
have a propensity for both higher profitability and higher levels of trading violations.  
 107. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (“[M]ajor American busi-
nesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace 
can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and 
viewpoints.” (citing to amici curiae briefs of 3M Corp. and General Motors Corp.)); Robin J. 
Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity Perspectives 
on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229, 229 (2001) (discussing ad-
vice in management literature that diversity enhances workgroup performance); David B. 
Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The 
Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1571-91 (2004) (discussing the widespread attachment to the belief 
that diversity enhances corporate profitability and competitiveness). 
 108. This attitude is reflected in the early caselaw involving workplace discrimination. 
See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“The issue be-
fore the Court is whether Title VII was intended to hold an employer liable for what is es-
sentially the isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct of one employee to another.” (foot-
note omitted)); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stat-
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tegrated American workforce, the empirical research indicates that 
the effect of diversity on organizational performance is complicated 
and uncertain and that diversity provides both benefits and costs de-
pending on context, time frame, and the type of diversity in ques-
tion.109  
 For example, researchers have studied the effects of two types of 
diversity—diversity with respect to “underlying attributes” and di-
versity with respect to “observable attributes”—on several different 
measures of workgroup performance, including outcomes, processes, 
and individual perceptions and satisfaction.110 Diversity on underly-
ing attributes—such as education, technical abilities, tenure in the 
organization, socioeconomic background, personality characteristics, 
or personal values—has been found in some studies to positively im-
pact outcomes by expanding the set of possibilities considered and 
discussed, leading to more creative solutions to organizational prob-
lems.111 At the same time, however, some studies have found that di-
versity on underlying attributes negatively affects workgroup proc-
esses by imposing costs, such as increased turnover and more formal, 
less frequent communication among workgroup members.112 Some 
studies have found these process losses to be offset, however, by in-
creased contact with members outside of the workgroup, resulting in 
a broader range of ideas considered by the workgroup.113 
 In contrast, the results of research on the impact of observable at-
tributes such as race, ethnicity, age, and gender provide grounds for 
more pessimism about the effects of diversity on workgroup perform-
ance. For example, demographically heterogeneous groups have per-
formed both better and worse than demographically homogenous 
groups in terms of workgroup outcomes, sometimes considering a 
greater number and diversity of alternatives in a decisionmaking 
                                                                                                                    
ing that a supervisor’s harassing conduct appeared to be “nothing more than a personal 
proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism”).  
 109. Ely & Thomas, supra note 107, at 229; Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, 
Searching for Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organ-
izational Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 402, 405-12 (1996) (summarizing the research on 
the impact of workgroup diversity on performance); Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. 
O’Reilly, III, Demography and Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Re-
search, in 20 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 77 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cum-
mings eds., 1998) (reviewing over eighty studies by psychologists, economists, sociologists, 
anthropologists, communication and education researchers, and organizational scholars). 
 110. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109; Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 109, at 93-
114. 
 111. See Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, at 409-12 (summarizing the literature). 
Researchers consider it important, however, that the majority of studies finding positive 
outcome effects of diversity are laboratory studies rather than field studies. See Williams & 
O’Reilly, supra note 109, at 79. 
 112. Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 109, at 94-96. 
 113. Id. at 94-98. 
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task and sometimes not.114 Furthermore, some studies have shown 
that, to the extent any creativity benefits do emerge from demog-
raphically heterogeneous groups, such benefits are likely to emerge 
only after the group has been together for some time.115 
 In addition, any positive impact on the outcome variable may be 
overshadowed by the negative impacts of demographic diversity on 
the process variable. In other words, to the extent that any outcome 
benefits may emerge from workgroup heterogeneity, they may be 
outweighed by the higher transaction costs of managing a demog-
raphically diverse workforce. As a general rule, more demographi-
cally diverse workgroups experience higher turnover rates, greater 
absenteeism of the dissimilar group members, lower levels of integra-
tion and communication, and lower levels of satisfaction and identifi-
cation with the group. In addition, individuals who are dissimilar 
from their supervisors on demographic variables tend to receive 
lower performance evaluations.116 As noted by Frances Milliken and 
Luis Martins, “[t]he consistency of these findings suggests . . . that 
groups and organizations will act systematically to drive out indi-
viduals who are different from the majority, unless this tendency to 
drive out diversity is managed.”117  
 In a recent paper, Professor Donald Langevoort provides a differ-
ent theory that, if true, also predicts a lack of organizational incen-
tives for the creation of a diverse workforce. Langevoort cogently ar-
gues that the mechanisms by which middle managers are hired, 
tested, and promoted within many firms reward the presence of psy-
chological traits—including overconfidence, risk taking, and 
“grease”—that are more commonly found in white males than in 
other demographic groups.118 If this is true, then corporate America’s 
mechanisms for selecting top managers may result in more profitable 
companies that exclude women and minorities from their upper 
ranks and impose other negative externalities on society through the 
choice of business decisions that they make. 
                                                                                                                    
 114. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, 405-409; Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 109, 
at 102-14. 
 115. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, at 407; Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 109, 
at 112. 
 116. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, at 405-08; Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 
109, at 103, 106, 113. 
 117. Milliken & Martins, supra note 109, at 420; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu 
Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1788 (2003) 
(book review) (arguing that “greater employee homogeneity decreases the transaction costs 
of managing a [diverse] workforce”). 
 118. Donald C. Langevoort, Diversity and Discrimination from a Corporate Perspective: 
Grease, Grit and the Personality Types of Tournament Survivors, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 15-16, 19-20, on file with author). 
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 According to Langevoort, many companies organize middle man-
agers into work teams that must solve some set of problems and then 
negotiate with non-team members within the firm the perception of 
how the team has performed.119 Typically, middle managers are ro-
tated through different workgroups and evaluated on both a team 
and individual basis.120 Accordingly, rising to the top of the manage-
ment pool requires iterated success—more likely if the individual is 
confident and willing to take risks121—and necessitates a psychologi-
cal makeup referred to by researchers as “High Machiavellianism,” 
or “high-Mach.”122  
 Both self-confidence and the tendency to take risks are believed to 
vary across gender, racial, and ethnic lines.123 Langevoort argues that 
the third trait required for managerial success—grease—is also more 
likely to be present in the dominant demographic group. He hypothe-
sizes that “greasy” people—those high-Mach individuals who are able 
to effortlessly make strong in-group connections when required and 
yet defect when it is in their self-interest—are likely to succeed in the 
managerial tournament.124 By contrast, “gritty” people—those who 
are unable to perform this routine successfully—will not.125 If the 
process of serially forming, and then dropping, strong in-group con-
nections is facilitated by homogeneity, the mere fact of being differ-
ent from the dominant majority may insert grit into the process. In 
other words, members of racial, gender, or cultural minority groups 
may be grittier simply by virtue of being different, unless they are 
                                                                                                                    
 119. Id. (manuscript at 12). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (manuscript at 15-16). Self-confidence is positively associated with the ability 
to persuade others, greater persistence, and a willingness to take risks. Id. (manuscript at 
15); SIMON GERVAIS ET AL., THE POSITIVE ROLE OF OVERCONFIDENCE AND OPTIMISM IN 
INVESTMENT POLICY (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 15-02, 
2002), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~rlwctr/papers/0215.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2005); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cog-
nitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 27-29 (1993) (arguing that optimistic 
bias in organizational judgments leads to risk taking). In any large organization where get-
ting ahead is based on iterated success of the nature described here, some percentage of 
“lucky risk-takers” are likely to distinguish themselves both from the unlucky risk-takers 
(who presumably fall out of the tournament early) and those who play it safe (thereby last-
ing in the tournament up to some point, but ultimately underperforming the lucky risk-
takers). Langevoort, supra note 118 (manuscript at 15). 
 122. Langevoort, supra note 118 (manuscript at 18). High-Mach individuals possess 
the ability to cooperate and display intense in-group loyalty when necessary, while behav-
ing in an aggressively competitive manner to out-group members. Id. (manuscript at 17-
18). Importantly, high-Mach individuals are able to seamlessly defect and switch to a new 
in-group when self-advancement so dictates. Id. (manuscript at 18); see also Samuel 
Bowles et al., The Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach, 39 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 1137, 1161-62 (2001). 
 123. Langevoort, supra note 118 (manuscript at 16). 
 124. Id. (manuscript at 19). 
 125. Id. 
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willing and able to successfully mimic the behavior of white males.126 
Langevoort argues that, although this may be efficient within the 
firm structure, “senior executive suites . . . overpopulated by high-
Mach risk-takers, filled with hubris, adept at self-deception, and 
empty of strong ethical grounding” may create troubling negative ex-
ternalities associated with the kind of business decisions they 
make.127 
 Similarly, the exclusion of certain demographic out-groups from 
the organization has historically been used by some corporations to 
inculcate employee loyalty and pride or to increase employee produc-
tivity. For example, southern textile mills once explicitly refused to 
hire African Americans in order to create a sense of privilege in their 
white workers.128 This sense of privilege was then employed to justify 
the mills’ low wages and unsafe working conditions.129  
 In addition, Ford Motor Company purposely excluded women from 
assembly line work during the early twentieth century. In so doing, 
the company was able to create an image of assembly-line work as 
masculine, calling into question the manhood of employees who could 
not meet target production levels and paying those who could a wage 
that, in the words of one Ford manager at the time, would help them 
“to be better men.”130 Although changed social mores and the advent 
of antidiscrimination laws have presumably induced organizations to 
abandon such practices as a conscious or explicit mechanism for in-
centivizing labor, the research on workgroup homogeneity discussed 
above suggests that organizations may still derive benefits from the 
exclusion of demographic out-group members. 
 I do not mean to suggest that organizations are free to create a 
completely homogenous workforce or that senior management con-
sciously or intentionally excludes on the basis of race or gender sim-
ply to improve cooperation and loyalty among employees. Both legal 
and societal constraints militate against such behavior. In addition, I 
do not claim to have offered any “proof” that discriminatory behavior 
positively affects firm profits. As already noted, the state of research 
in this field is not sufficiently developed to support such a conclusion. 
                                                                                                                    
 126. Id. (manuscript at 20); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Iden-
tity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Naomi Ellemers et al., Sticking Together or Falling 
Apart: In-Group Identification as a Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment Ver-
sus Individual Mobility, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1997).  
 127. Langevoort, supra note 118 (manuscript at 22-23). 
 128.  DAVID L. CARLTON, MILL AND TOWN IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1880-1920 (1982); 
NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX ET AL., BEYOND MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: TOWARD A NEW 
SYNTHESIS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 9029, 2002). 
 129. LAMOREAUX ET AL., supra note 128, at 28. 
 130. Id. at 28-29; Wayne A. Lewchuk, Men and Monotony: Fraternalism as a Manage-
rial Strategy at the Ford Motor Company, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 824, 843 (1993). 
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Instead, my goal is simply to call into question the automatic as-
sumption that behaviors such as those discussed in this Part repre-
sent pure occupational misconduct that provides no organizational 
benefits, as opposed to organizational misconduct that provides sub-
tle but tangible benefits to the organizational enterprise. If these be-
haviors do provide such benefits, then the legal regime’s assumption 
that internal compliance structures ostensibly designed to curb agent 
misconduct will suffice to correct this behavior is erroneous. 
(c)   Financial Fraud 
 Financial fraud is particularly difficult to categorize, as the crea-
tion of false profitability may benefit shareholder principals under 
some circumstances and not in others. Some instances of financial 
fraud undoubtedly harm shareholders. Indeed, in many cases, de-
frauding shareholders is the ultimate goal of the fraudulent scheme. 
In addition, when financial fraud is engaged in for the purpose of 
concealing poor management or creating the illusion that some divi-
sion is profitable when it is actually a drain on organizational re-
sources and should be sold, shareholders are harmed.131 
 At the same time, however, some well-known instances of finan-
cial fraud were the result of attempts by organizational management 
to create the appearance of profitability in order to derive some bene-
fit—for example, outside funding—that would augment shareholder 
wealth. For instance, alleged Kidder Peabody “rogue trader” Joseph 
Jett contended that Kidder management had full knowledge of and 
encouraged his fictitious trades because they created the temporary 
illusion that Kidder’s trading operations were profitable. This al-
lowed Kidder to obtain a large loan from Union Bank of Switzerland 
that Kidder badly needed to provide operating capital.132 
 Similarly, part of the asserted rationale for Enron’s false financial 
statements was that revealing the truth about its financial condition 
would result in a credit-rating downgrade, severely hampering its 
ability to conduct its derivatives business and undermining Enron’s 
profitability and share price.133 In addition, Enron’s fraudulent re-
porting regarding its trading floor operations was reportedly under-
taken to enhance its share price. In other words, the allegation is 
that Enron smoothed the volatility of its trading floor profits, thus 
                                                                                                                    
 131. This is true even if a short-term shareholder owning stock only in that company 
would benefit from an inflated stock price. Because most shares in large companies are 
owned by diversified shareholders who trade securities fairly actively, portfolio value 
should be enhanced by accurate reporting, even if the value of an individual stock would be 
temporarily enhanced by false reporting. 
 132. In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 133. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1275, 1323-24 (2002). 
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making the company appear less risky than it was and, correspond-
ingly, enhancing share price.134 
B.   Public Choice Reasons 
 In prior work, I have presented evidence that public choice theory 
may explain some of the legal system’s extreme reliance on internal 
compliance structures as a liability determinant.135 According to the 
interest group branch of public choice theory, well-organized interest 
groups are able to extract benefits from the government while impos-
ing the costs on less organized groups, typically broad-based seg-
ments of the general public, such as consumers.136 
 It may seem surprising that business interests—one of the most 
organized, effective, and well-financed interest groups involved in the 
political process—have not defeated the development of organiza-
tional liability provisions (and the recent proliferation of organiza-
tional criminal liability provisions, in particular). Given the success 
that business interests frequently demonstrate in defeating the im-
plementation of legal rules that they consider onerous, organizational 
liability provisions thus present—at first glance—a bit of a mystery. 
In other words, why have business interests not blocked the passage 
of organizational liability provisions such as those discussed in this 
Article? 
 Although several potential explanations are plausible, one obvious 
answer is that organizational liability provisions are not as costly to 
business organizations as they may at first appear.137 Although busi-
ness interests and those who could face personal liability for organ-
izational violations (such as boards of directors under In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation138) would presumably prefer 
to suffer no organizational liability for the conduct of employee 
agents, a legal regime that conditions or mitigates liability on the ba-
                                                                                                                    
 134. Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 
VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1260 (2003); see also Patrick Barta & John D. McKinnon, Freddie May 
Have Understated Profits by up to $4.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2003, at C1 (discuss-
ing disclosures by Freddie Mac that it violated accounting rules and, in some cases, under-
stated profits in order to smooth volatility in earnings). 
 135. See Krawiec, supra note 21.  
 136. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3 (1971). Another branch of public choice theory, voting theory, is based on the work of 
Kenneth Arrow and holds that determinations based on majority rule may give rise to ran-
dom or shifting outcomes, a process known as “cycling.” KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). 
 137. Organizational liability provisions may also reflect an agency cost problem. If the 
presence of organizational liability results in a lower probability of personal liability for 
corporate officers and directors, then organizational liability may represent an attempt by 
officers and directors to deflect their personal liability onto organizational defendants. 
Khanna, supra note 8, at 1253-55. 
 138. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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sis of internal compliance structures—while expensive and waste-
ful—is far less onerous than actually altering current business prac-
tices or paying damages for agent misconduct. As a result, when the 
public outcry for constraints on organizational misconduct becomes 
too loud for lawmakers to ignore, business interests may agree to 
heightened organizational liability in exchange for a “safe harbor” in 
the form of mitigation based on internal compliance structures.139  
 At the same time, legal compliance professionals benefit im-
mensely—both financially and in terms of their importance and 
status within organizations—from a legal regime that conditions li-
ability on the presence of internal compliance structures. Perhaps for 
this reason, legal compliance professionals have been at the forefront 
of the push to adopt internal compliance structures, sometimes over-
stating to a significant degree both the risks of a failure to adopt 
such structures and the benefits of having such structures in place.140  
 Although both business organizations and legal compliance pro-
fessionals have had a substantial impact on the development of in-
ternal compliance-based legal regimes in the United States, the two 
groups have made that impact in different ways. For example, busi-
ness organizations (including the Business Roundtable) lobbied hard 
for an internal compliance-based mitigation of sentences under the 
OSG.141 By contrast, legal compliance professionals appear to have 
satisfied their agenda more indirectly and have played a particularly 
important role in the development of judicially crafted internal com-
pliance-based liability standards.  
 The judicial recognition of internal compliance-based liability de-
fenses follows a particular pattern that highlights the important role 
played by legal compliance professionals in the development of com-
mon law compliance-based organizational liability standards. First, 
the tendency of legal compliance professionals to overstate both a 
new legal risk and their ability to contain that risk through internal 
                                                                                                                    
 139. See Khanna, supra note 5, at 102-03 (querying why business interests have not 
managed to extract such a safe harbor). This public outcry may be especially likely to occur 
following the disclosure of a series of corporate misdeeds during a weak economic period. 
Id. at 104. For example, commentators have explained the political climate leading to the 
passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 on exactly these grounds. See, e.g., id. 
 140. See Krawiec, supra note 21 (describing this literature); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 
58, at 134-40 (describing this trend in connection with sexual harassment training); Bisom-
Rapp, Ounce, supra note 76, at 13-15 (same). 
 141. William S. Lofquist, Legislating Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Busi-
ness Power, and Corporate Crime Control, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 741, 746 tbl.2 (1993) (pro-
viding figures on the lobbying activity of the Business Roundtable, National Association of 
Manufacturers, Chamber of Commerce, numerous corporations, and other interested pub-
lic and private groups in connection with the OSG); McKendall et al., supra note 30, at 370 
(discussing pressure from the business community to adopt guidelines that account for or-
ganizations’ internal compliance efforts). 
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compliance structures has been well documented.142 Several studies, 
for example, have documented the extent to which legal and man-
agement journals overstated the legal benefits of internal grievance 
procedures in defending against liability in sexual harassment suits 
and the need for personnel practices designed to minimize employer 
liability in wrongful discharge suits.143 Second, business organiza-
tions (either unaware of, or disinterested in, the fact that the ren-
dered advice is incorrect) adopt the legal compliance professionals’ 
recommendations.144 Third, when faced with liability decisions, 
courts look to industry standards to determine whether the organiza-
tion has met its duty to avoid the harm in question.145 As a result, the 
recommendations of internal compliance professionals become a part 
of the liability determination and deviations from them result in 
costly liability determinations. 
 At the same time, the solutions to perceived legal problems rec-
ommended by legal compliance professionals are more palatable to 
management, because they disrupt managerial discretion and cur-
rent business practice as little as possible. An internal compliance-
based regime thus may represent an equilibrium agreement among 
business interests, legal compliance professionals, and lawmakers 
that satisfies public demands for regulation while doing little to dis-
rupt business practices and enhancing the profitability and impor-
                                                                                                                    
 142. See Krawiec, supra note 21, at 529 (discussing the evidence on this); Donald C. 
Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Trans-
mitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997). 
 143. See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The In-
flated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47 (1992) (studying the extent 
to which personnel, legal academic, and legal practitioner journals overstate the legal risk 
of wrongful discharge suits); Edelman et al., supra note 60 (studying the impact that legal 
compliance professionals had on the development of grievance procedures as a legal de-
fense under sexual harassment law); Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, A Tale of Two Sectors: 
The Spread of Anti-Harassment Remedies Among Public and Private Employers 3 (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (studying the role played by personnel professionals 
in the development and acceptance of internal grievance procedures as a defense to organ-
izational liability in sexual harassment cases and concluding that “the legal remedy to 
harassment was clearly fashioned by a group with a professional interest in promoting 
that remedy”). 
 144. See Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 143, at 40 (stating that the courts did not lead the 
development of legal rules governing the role of grievance procedures as a defense in sex-
ual harassment suits but instead followed what the corporations were doing at the behest 
of personnel professionals); Edelman et al., supra note 60, at 451 (documenting the diffu-
sion of internal grievance procedures within organizations prior to the legitimation of the 
defense by the courts). 
 145. Dobbin & Kelley, supra note 143, at 40 (noting that the courts followed and le-
gitimated what business organizations had been doing—adopting internal grievance pro-
cedures—rather than fashioning a remedy on their own); Edelman et al., supra note 60, at 
440 (noting that, eventually, the Supreme Court legitimated the originally erroneous legal 
advice that personnel professionals had rendered regarding grievance procedures by estab-
lishing them as part of a two-part affirmative defense).  
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tance of another powerful interest group—legal compliance profes-
sionals. 
VI.   THE CHOICE OF VICARIOUSLY LIABLE PARTY 
 This Article has, for the most part, addressed only the role of or-
ganizational liability for agent misconduct. Under some circum-
stances, however, cogent arguments can be made that senior man-
agement or board liability should supplement or substitute for the 
organization as the vicariously liable party. Although this Article 
does not reject such a possibility, the obstacles to and problems with 
this approach should be briefly noted. 
 First, the limited assets of organizational agents is a commonly 
asserted rationale for organizational-level liability in the first 
place.146 Although senior managers and board members may have 
deeper pockets than lower-level violators, the harm caused by many 
acts of organizational misconduct is nonetheless likely to exceed most 
individuals’ assets, leading to a failure to fully internalize the costs of 
misconduct and, therefore, an underdeterrence of organizational mis-
conduct.147 
 In addition, imposing liability—especially criminal liability—on 
an individual who did not actively participate in and was unaware of 
the misconduct in question is a rare, but not unheard of, move in the 
American legal regime.148 As a result, fairness concerns are likely to 
compel courts to impose this type of individual liability only in the 
most egregious cases, such as when the court is convinced that man-
agement knew about or recklessly determined to remain unaware of 
ongoing misconduct. If this is so, then most of the benefits of vicari-
ous liability will be lost and organizational liability will remain a 
necessary tool to deter organizational misconduct. Nonetheless, fur-
ther research into the choice of vicariously liable party is needed. 
                                                                                                                    
 146. See supra note 6. 
 147. Although director and officer liability insurance policies may pay for many vicari-
ous liability judgments against officers and directors, because the firm typically pays the 
bulk of these premiums, deterrence may still be undermined. 
 148. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 348 (2003) (noting 
that, although collective sanctions may seem natural in tribal or clan-based societies, in 
“modern, liberal societies, however, where the relevant moral unit is the individual, pun-
ishing groups for the misdeeds of individuals will be regarded with deep skepticism”); 
Adam Liptak, The World: My Brother’s Keeper; Is the Group Responsible for the Individ-
ual’s Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, § 4, at 5. In contrast, many other cultures hold in-
dividuals or groups—for example, family members or fellow villagers—who are not con-
nected to the misconduct responsible on the theory that such groups or individuals may be 
better positioned to identify and punish culpable individuals and may be motivated to do so 
by the threat of collective liability. Levinson, supra, at 348 (“Group members might be pun-
ished not because they are deemed collectively responsible for wrongdoing but simply be-
cause they are in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and control responsible 
individuals, and can be motivated by the threat of sanctions to do so.”); Liptak, supra. 
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
 In closing, I should emphasize not only this Article’s conclusions 
but also what it does not conclude. Specifically, it is not the conten-
tion of this Article that internal compliance structures can never play 
a role in deterring organizational misconduct. Indeed, internal com-
pliance structures—in the hands of a competent and committed 
management team—may play a central role in the organization’s 
preventive approach to organizational misconduct, depending on the 
size and structure of the specific organization.149 In addition, by em-
phasizing the important role played by organizational culture and 
management commitment to ethical behavior in deterring miscon-
duct, I am not advocating a legal regime in which courts, agencies, or 
prosecutors attempt to directly evaluate those factors in assessing 
organizational liability for agent misconduct. As with internal com-
pliance structures, legal decisionmakers are unlikely to possess suffi-
cient information to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of these 
factors in any reliable way. As a result, I conclude that the U.S. legal 
regime’s move away from strict vicarious liability to internal compli-
ance-based liability is unjustified by either theory or empirical evi-
dence.  
 At the same time, the obstacles to a return to strict vicarious li-
ability are strong and are both theoretical and political. As a theo-
retical matter, so long as legal academics and legal decisionmakers 
continue to view organizational misconduct as a principal-agent 
problem which can be fully addressed through better policing and ig-
nore the subtle, but tangible, benefits that may flow to the organiza-
tional enterprise from such conduct, the legal system will continue to 
gravitate toward solutions that provide incentives for “policing,” 
without ever addressing the root causes of organizational miscon-
duct. 
 As a political matter, the current legal regime may exist not be-
cause it effectively addresses organizational misconduct, but because 
it satisfies the needs of a variety of powerful interest groups, includ-
ing business organizations and legal compliance professionals, while 
                                                                                                                    
 149. See generally Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 72. Very small, centralized or-
ganizations may find formal internal compliance structures unnecessary and prohibitively 
expensive. Perhaps for this reason, small businesses have expressed some concern that 
they are disadvantaged by the OSG requirements, although firm size is taken into account 
in the sentencing guidelines. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 8B2.1, cmt. 
n.2(C). It is unclear, however, whether many small firms would gain the benefit of the OSG 
mitigation provisions, even in the absence of the internal compliance provisions of the 
Guidelines. This is because many small organizations sentenced under the Guidelines are 
ineligible for sentence mitigation, due to top-management knowledge of or participation in 
the misconduct. John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior—The Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit, in 1 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2002, at 
113, 131 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1317, 2002). 
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at the same time addressing the occasional (though increasingly fre-
quent) public outcry for constraints on organizational misbehavior.  
 
